

INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Fall 2011 Meeting
21 and 22 October 2011

Ogle Center
Hanover College
Hanover, Indiana

Meeting Program

Friday, 21 October

	Session A	Session B
11:30-12	<i>Registration, Ogle Center Lobby</i>	
	Ethics	Metaphysics and Causation
12-12:55	"Integrity and Identification" Speaker: Elijah Weber (Bowling Green State University) Comments: Leigh Viner (Indiana University Southeast) Chair: Barton Updike (Ivy Tech)	"Modifying the Interventionist Solution to the Problem of Causal Exclusion" Danny Pearlberg (Ohio State University) Trin Turner (Indiana University) David McCarty (Indiana University)
1-1:55	"Two Claims About Desert" Speaker: Nathan Hanna (Drexel University) Comments: Peter Celello (Ohio State University Newark) Chair: Barton Updike (Ivy Tech)	"Causal Loops and Time Travel" Nick Colgrove (Independent Scholar) David McCarty (Indiana University) Jared Bates (Hanover College)
1:55-2:15	<i>Break</i>	
	Modern Philosophy	Ethics and Epistemology Entangled
2:15-3:10	"Hobbesian Justification for Animal Rights" Speaker: Shane Courtland (Univ of Minnesota Duluth) Comments: Nina Atanasova (University of Cincinnati) Chair: Brian Hall (Indiana University Southeast)	"Moral Responsibility and Assessment: The Case of George W. Bush" Katherine Biederman (Bellarmine University) Robert J. Rosenthal (Hanover College) Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)
3:15-4:10	"The Argument-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" Speaker: Justin Shaddock (Independent Scholar) Comments: Kevin Harrelson (Ball State University) Chair: Bernd Buldt (IPFW)	"The Skill Model of Virtue and the Psychology of Expertise" Matt Stichter (Washington State University) Ayça Mazman (University of Cincinnati) Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)
4:15-5:10	"Kant on Newton, Genius, and Scientific Discovery" Speaker: Brian Hall (Indiana University Southeast) Comments: Bernd Buldt (IPFW) Chair: Mike Koss (Indiana University)	"Writing Wrongs: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and the Epistemology of Testimony" Ben Almassi (College of Lake County) Anne Baril (University of Notre Dame) Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)
5:10-5:30	<i>Break (with refreshments)</i>	
5:30-6:45	Keynote Address "Group Belief: Lessons from Lies" Jennifer Lackey, Northwestern University	

Following Friday's sessions we will enjoy dinner out in Madison
followed by a reception at the home of Jared Bates.

Saturday, 22 October

	Session A	Session B
8:30-9am	<i>Registration and continental breakfast (breads, pastries, fruit, and beverages), Ogle Center Lobby</i>	
	Epistemology, Language, Science and Mathematics	
9-9:55 Speaker: Comments: Chair:	"The Pitfalls of Pragmatic Encroachment" David Coss (Purdue University) Jeffrey Dunn (Depauw University) Ben Almassi (College of Lake County)	"Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology" Mark Alfano (University of Notre Dame) Ellie Wang (Indiana University) Elijah Weber (Bowling Green State University)
10-10:55 Speaker: Comments: Chair:	"Metaphysical Possibility and Scientific Practice" Ioan Muntean (IPFW) David Fisher (Indiana University) Jared Bates (Hanover College)	"Reliability for Degrees of Belief" Jeffrey Dunn (Depauw University) David Coss (Purdue University) Ben Almassi (College of Lake County)
11-11:55 Speaker: Comments: Chair:	"Type Pluralism and the Semantics of Measurement" Eric Snyder (Ohio State University) Mike Koss (Indiana University) Ioan Muntean (IPFW)	"How Moral Meaning is in the Head" John Jung Park (Duke University) Jonathan Maci (University of Chicago) Elijah Weber (Bowling Green State University)
11:55-1:30	<i>Lunch Break and Business Meeting</i>	
	Rawlsian Political Philosophy	Reasons for Action, Moral and Epistemological
1:30-2:25 Speaker: Comments: Chair:	"Incentives and a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice" Aaron Pischel Elliott (University of Nebraska) John Ahrens (Hanover College) Mark Alfano (University of Notre Dame)	"Acting on Epistemological Hopes" Kris Rhodes (Martin University) Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)
2:30-3:25 Speaker: Comments: Chair:	"The Limits of International Toleration: A Rawlsian Response to Thomas Pogge" Everett Fulmer (Georgia State University) Aaron Pischel Elliott (University of Nebraska) John Ahrens (Hanover College)	"From Strategies to Acts: Defending the Reduction of Morality to Self-Interest" Travis N. Rieder (Georgetown University) Jonathan Evans (University of Indianapolis) Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)
3:30-5:00	Panel: Professional Philosophy and Public Discourse – Does Philosophy Matter?	
	Speakers: Mark Brouwer (Wabash College): "Philosophy does not and should not matter to public discourse" Stephen Webb (Wabash College): "Philosophy does and should matter to public discourse" Sam Rocha (Wabash College): "Philosophy does not but should matter to public discourse" Chair: Jared Bates (Hanover College)	

Abstracts of Presented Papers

"Acting on Epistemological Hopes," by Kris Rhodes

One need not believe in a causal connection between one's actions goals in order to rationally undertake those actions in pursuit of those goals. Indeed, it is possible for an agent to *know* there is no such connection, yet be rational in undertaking the action. Instead what one needs is a belief that there is a certain *epistemological* connection between the action and the goal. The agent must think that by undertaking the action he makes the

world such that he'll have *strong reasons to think* Y will come about. I'll argue for this position using a scenario similar to Newcomb's Problem. I'll then make suggestions as to how this position might make a difference in realistic contexts—for example, in attempts to understand how certain moral actions can be rational, and how any actions can be rational in the face of the Problem of Induction.

"The Argument-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories," by Justin Shaddock

I propose novel solutions to two longstanding problems concerning Kant's Transcendental Deduction. The first problem is that while Kant aims to prove that appearances must involve the categories in order to be objective, he states that objects may appear without the categories. I explain that Kant means to contrast the respective roles that his transcendental idealism plays in his Deduction and Aesthetic. The second problem is that Kant argues for his Deduction's conclusion twice over. I explain that Kant's two arguments are necessary to overturn a prior position of his from his Inaugural Dissertation.

"Causal Loops and Time Travel," by Nicholas Colgrove

This paper will prove that causal loops are not a problematic result of time travel if one is committed to an eternalist view of time. In other words, the common "causal loop" objection to time travel depends on hidden presentist presuppositions. In the first section, I will carefully define the terms and viewpoints in question while in the second section, I will bring together the various views to show that causal loops are unproblematic for those committed to an eternalist view of time and a perdurantist view of persistence. In the third section, I will raise various objections to the creation of causal loops and flush out the presentist presuppositions that contribute to the potential lethality of these objections. Ultimately, stripped of their presentist foundation, these objections will be shown to be fully innocuous to the eternalist. Finally, I will conclude by demonstrating the benefits entailed in accepting the possibility of causal loops concerning the potential for efficacious petitionary prayer.

"Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology" by Mark Alfano

The last few decades have witnessed the birth and growth of both *virtue epistemology* and the *situationist challenge to virtue ethics*. It seems only natural that eventually we would see the *situationist challenge to virtue epistemology*. For reliabilists, someone is justified in believing that *p* just in case her belief was acquired and retained through the exercise of intellectual virtue, and she knows that *p* just in case her justified belief that *p* is true. Empirical research on cognitive dispositions spells trouble for reliabilist accounts of justification and knowledge. The trouble can be framed as an inconsistent triad: (*non-skepticism*) many people know lots of things; (*inferential reliabilism*) Inferential knowledge is true belief acquired and retained through inferential reliabilist intellectual virtue; (*inferential cognitive situationism*) People acquire and retain most of their inferential beliefs through heuristics rather than intellectual virtues. *Nonskepticism* is an unrevisable Moorean platitude. I muster evidence from cognitive and social psychology to argue for *inferential cognitive situationism*. If my argument is correct, then *inferential reliabilism* must be rejected.

"From Strategies to Acts: Defending the Reduction of Morality to Self-Interest," by Travis N. Rieder

Those who intend to reduce morality to self-interest must respond to Hobbes' Fool: if morality is really to be generated from particular agents' interests, then how do we deal with those cases in which it seems clearly in one's interest to act in paradigmatically immoral ways? A promising response is to argue indirectly, holding that it is in one's interest to adopt, as a strategy, the rules of common sense morality. In this paper, I accept this indirect argument for reductionism, with the goal of seeing whether, given the move from acts to strategies, we can in fact derive the desired judgments about particular, token acts. I conclude that we can, since we ought to act on the strategies we ought to adopt. I close by responding to a purported counterexample to this claim, put forward by Derek Parfit.

“Hobbesian Justification for Animal Rights,” by Shane Courtland

Hobbes's political and ethical theories are rarely viewed as places by which those who protect the weak seek refuge. It would seem odd, then, to suggest that such a theory might be able to protect the weakest among us – non-human animals. In this paper, however, I will defend the possibility of a Hobbesian justification for animal rights. As I will show, the Hobbesian response to the problem of compliance should allow contractarianism to extend (at least some) normative protection to animals.

“How Moral Meaning Is in the Head,” by John Jung Park

When examining certain natural kind concepts that refer to three-dimensional objects such as “water” and “gold,” Hillary Putnam uses Twin Earth thought experiments to famously argue that “meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” While this may be true for such concepts, this paper examines abstract moral concepts such as “virtue” and “justice” to contend that meaning is in the head for moral concepts. An analogue of Putnam’s Twin Earth hypothetical has been created by Terrance Horgan and Mark Timmons to reject the semantic and meta-ethical claims made by ethical naturalists. However, I offer a new variant of their Moral Twin Earth hypothetical in order to specifically argue that if moral properties exist and moral concepts refer to such properties, a narrow theory of content holds for moral concepts, where the reference and meaning for moral concepts supervenes upon the internal physical-psychological states of agents. This revised hypothetical is called Semantic Moral Twin Earth. Through this thought experiment, the conclusion is reached that there is strong support that moral concepts have narrow content, which has important implications for moral semantics in meta-ethics.

“Incentives and a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice,” by Aaron Pischel Elliott

Most Rawlsians believe that the principles of justice apply only to social institutions, not to individual action or choice. Cohen finds this position to be untenable and instead argues that there must be an ethos of justice for a society to be just. Whether this is the case is topic of contention. So has the question of whether Cohen correctly describes what a Rawlsian ethos would look like. This paper addresses the second question, under the assumption that an ethos is required. I examine a critique offered by Titelbaum and reconceive of Cohen’s ethos accordingly. Equipped with a better understanding of what a Rawlsian ethos of justice would be like, I relate it to Cohen’s discussion of incentives. In doing so I illustrate a crucial consequence of an egalitarian ethos that Cohen failed to recognize. Then, I show how this has larger ramifications to Rawls’s overall theory of justice.

“Integrity and Identification,” by Elijah Weber

Bernard Williams argues that the demands of utilitarianism amount to an attack on the agent’s integrity. While this objection at first seems immediately problematic for the utilitarian, it also admits of an ambiguity regarding the sense in which a project can count as the agent’s own. I argue that this objection turns on a narrative understanding of the agent’s own projects, and that an agent’s identification with her own projects is both conceptually distinct from and obtains independently of her numerical identity. This is contrary to Williams’s view, wherein the identification relation that an agent bears to her projects is constitutive of her numerical identity. The integrity objection, when properly framed in terms of a failure to respect the identification relation, does indicate a serious problem for utilitarianism. However, violations of agent integrity are simply not a problem that has anything to do with numerical identity.

“Kant on Newton, Genius, and Scientific Discovery,” by Brian Hall

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines genius by distinguishing it from science and uses Newton as his paradigmatic example of a ‘great mind’ who was nevertheless not a genius. Kant believes that Newton possesses what today would be called a ‘logic of discovery,’ i.e., a rule-governed procedure where the discovery is the logical consequence of certain well-established premises. Since Newton possesses a logic of discovery, there is no gap that the creativity of genius could occupy between what the rule-governed procedure dictates and the discovery itself. Although I will argue (pace Kant) that Newton does possess a logic of discovery for

establishing his law of universal gravitation, nevertheless, he does not possess a rule-governed procedure for generating the logic of discovery he uses to establish the law of universal gravitation. As I hope to show, this second-order discovery makes Newton count as a scientific genius by Kant's own lights.

"The Limits of International Toleration: A Rawlsian Response to Thomas Pogge," by Everett Fulmer

John Rawls's *The Law of Peoples* (LP) has been plagued by extreme controversy since its publication—most notably from devout Rawlsians. There have been two main types of objections to LP from a Rawlsian perspective: (1) LP is too weak in its demands on international society and (2) LP is inconsistent with Rawls's views on domestic justice. At the heart of both of these objections is Rawls's conception of the limits of international toleration. According to Rawls, any liberal theory of international justice must permit a substantial degree of non-liberalism in the international community. And conversely, a liberal theory that demands democracy, political equality, economic equality, or value individualism across the globe is a liberalism that contradicts itself. Thomas Pogge has developed a forceful and well known objection to Rawls's views on the limits of international toleration. It is my aim in this paper to show that Pogge is mistaken.

"Metaphysical Possibility and Scientific Practice," by Ioan Muntean

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the interplay between philosophy of science and metaphysics. I emphasize the relevance of possibilities in contemporary science by critically discussing two deflationary doctrines: manifestationalism and eliminativism. Then I scrutinize Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism as a relevant alternative and a criticism (J. Lady-man) against its modal implications. My analysis, exclusively dedicated to possibilities, focuses on the possibility as generated by scientific models. I defend a particular type of deflationary account of modalities rooted in the practice of science. I define possibility as used in science as model-dependent, grounded in idealization, abstraction and fictionalization. I adopt a variant of holism according to which relations among models are crucial in the way science deals with possibility.

"Modifying the Interventionist Solution to the Problem of Causal Exclusion," by Danny Pearlberg

I respond on behalf of the interventionist account of causation to a compelling objection raised by Michael Baumgartner. Although Baumgartner is correct in pointing out a flaw in the interventionist account of causation when applied to the problem of causal exclusion, this flaw may be fixed by means of a slight modification to the interventionist account as it currently stands. The modification retains the spirit, if not the letter, of the interventionist account, and it allows the interventionist to endorse the causal efficacy of the mental. In addition, given the wide range of variables studied throughout the sciences that bear supervenience relations to one another, the modification is critical not just for the purposes of solving the problem of causal exclusion, but also for the purposes of salvaging interventionism as a credible account of the role played by causation in actual scientific practice.

"Moral Responsibility and Assessment: The Case of George W. Bush," by Katherine Biederman

One of the persistent problems of moral theories is that they do not sufficiently account for difficult cases in which an agent is ignorant of the relevant facts, features, or consequences of his actions. Traditionally, moral philosophers assert that actions, outcomes, character dispositions (or some combination thereof) are the proper object(s) of moral assessment. In this paper, I examine George W. Bush's 2003 decision to go to war with Iraq with the intent to motivate an alternative understanding of the nature of moral assessment. I show that the proper object(s) of moral assessment must include one's belief-related practices. Such practices are implicitly identified by moral theories yet insufficiently acknowledged by their conditions for assessment. I argue that an agent's belief-related practices must factor into any adequate account of moral assessment for the reason that a responsible moral agent is not simply one who satisfies moral standards.

“The Pitfalls of Pragmatic Encroachment,” by David Coss

Pragmatic encroachment (PE) has recently garnered much attention among epistemologists. According to (PE), whether S knows that p depends upon what is at stake for S. I first outline what pragmatic encroachment is and why one might think it is true. I then argue against the view, relying upon a counter-example first proposed by Ram Neta. I delineate three varieties of pragmatic encroachment, showing how Neta’s example only works against the strongest variety. I conclude by strengthening Neta’s counter-example to defeat all three varieties.

“Professional Philosophy and Public Discourse: Does philosophy matter?” by Mark Brouwer, Stephen Webb, and Sam Rocha

In this panel discussion each participant will argue for a significantly different answer to the basic question: whether philosophy does and should make important contributions to public policy and the intellectual life of our various communities. While this discussion is inevitably part of broader questions about the relationship of higher education to the political community, we will address the institution of professional philosophy in particular. We intend to introduce and open the basic question for discussion within the Indiana Philosophical Association and beyond.

“Reliability for Degrees of Belief,” by Jeffrey Dunn

We often evaluate belief-forming processes or entire belief states in terms of reliability. This is straightforward in the *Binary Framework*, where beliefs are thought of as all-or-nothing. Here I consider how to think about reliability in the *Graded Framework*, where beliefs come in degrees. The dominant proposal, which has been championed by Alvin Goldman ([*forthcoming*], [1999], Goldman & Shaked [1991]), understands the reliability of a process in terms of the *degree* of truth it gathers. I argue that this proposal is inadequate but for an interesting reason. In the Binary Framework, a process that is reliable both gathers a high ratio of truths to falsehoods and is also highly calibrated with what it is indicating. However, in the Graded Framework, these two features come apart. Through a series of examples, I argue that the calibration approach is preferable if reliability is to be closely linked with epistemic justification.

“The Skill Model of Virtue,” by Matt Stichter

One approach to understanding virtue has been to compare and contrast virtues with practical skills, since both involve learning how to act well. If the thesis that a virtue is a type of skill is correct, then it will have a significant impact on our conceptions of virtue and moral knowledge. Determining whether a skill model of virtue is plausible requires answering two central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? This paper delves into both questions, by analyzing some of the current psychological research on expertise and exploring the philosophical implications of that research for virtue theory. Various arguments that have been given both for and against the skill model of virtue will be examined in order to determine which arguments are empirically consistent with the psychology literature.

“Two Claims About Desert,” by Nathan Hanna

Many philosophers claim that it’s always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that we always have some reason to give people what they deserve. I offer some counterexamples, highlight some problems with the claims, and defend an alternative view. My discussion has broad implications, but my immediate concern is to expose a gap in desert-based justifications of punishment. Advocates of these justifications typically assume the above claims. If they’re false, many of the desert claims these justifications appeal to may not say anything in favor of punishment.

"Type Pluralism and the Semantics of Measurement," by Eric Snyder

In this paper I argue for two key claims. First, I argue that cardinals denote multiple semantic types, contrary to certain influential theories in the Philosophy of Mathematics which hold that cardinals are either exclusively referential (Frege) or quantificational expressions (Hodes, Hofweber). In fact, following Partee, I claim that cardinals are primarily predicative expressions, namely properties of plural individuals or groups, and their referential and quantificational denotations are derivable from their primary semantic type via certain plausible semantic type-shifting principles. The result is a semantics which respects the syntactic and semantic facts but does not require positing an infinite number of unnecessary lexical ambiguities. Secondly, implementing the suggestions of Schwarzschild, I argue that the resulting analysis of cardinals leads to a promising semantics for measure phrases like 'three meters tall(er)'.

"Writing Wrongs: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and the Epistemology of Testimony," by Ben Almassi

Plagiarism may be understood as a kind of theft; yet the writer or speaker whose words are stolen is not the only party whom the plagiarist wrongs. The broader scope of plagiarism as wrongdoing can be seen alongside other research misconduct such as fabrication, suppression, ghostwriting, drylabbing, and hyper-extended expertise. I propose we understand such errant research as cases of *vicious testimony* by building on Miranda Fricker's notion of *epistemic injustice*. Fricker sees testimonial injustice as an ethical-epistemic harm committed against speakers (or writers) by hearers (or readers) who give their testimony less credibility than it deserves because of negative prejudicial stereotypes. Here I seek to extend epistemic injustice to include *testifier injustices*, such that plagiarism, fabrication, and the like are understood as ethical-epistemic wrongdoings committed by speakers and writers *against* listeners and readers. Vicious testimony then may be usefully contrasted by *conscientious testimony* as a guide for research ethics and for science as social knowledge.