



Indiana Philosophical Association

Joint Meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association with the
 Conference on Hegel, Analytic Philosophy and Formal Logic
 Indiana University - Purdue University, Fort Wayne
 17-18 October 2014, Walb Union, 2nd Floor

Meeting Program

Friday, 17 October

9-9:55 Classic Ballroom	"On the Very Possibility of a Formal Logic, and Why Dialectical Logic Cannot Be One" Ermanno Bencivenga (University of California, Irvine)	
10-11	<i>Registration for IPA Conference</i>	
	Room 222	Room 226
	Truth and Mind Chair: Bernd Buldt (Indiana U-Purdue U, Ft Wayne)	Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science Chair: Kris Rhodes (Martin University)
11-11:55	"Frege's Realism: The Truth About Beauty"	"The Paradox of Deterministic Probabilities"
Speaker: Comments:	Chapman Waters (Purdue University) Charles Djordjevic (Independent)	Valia Allori (Northern Illinois University) Brett Mullins (Georgia State University)
12-12:55	"Truth and Lies in a Non-Normative Sense: A Reply to the Inflationary Argument"	"How to be a Scientific Realist"
Speaker: Comments:	Drew Johnson (Northern Illinois University) Jim Elliot (Purdue University)	Jonathan Fuqua (Purdue University) Adam Hayden (Indiana U-Purdue U, Indy)
1-1:55	"An Husserlian Critique of McDowell's Conceptualism"	"Setting the Stage for a Problem with Animalism and Sparse Ontologies in Bioethics"
Speaker: Comments:	Jered Janes (Marquette University) Daniel Lindquist (Indiana University)	David Gordon Limbaugh (University at Buffalo) Nikolas Montgomery (Indiana University)
1:55-2:15	<i>Break with Refreshments</i>	
2:15-3:10 Classic Ballroom	"The Logical Structure of Dialectic" Graham Priest (CUNY Graduate Center)	
	Political Philosophy Chair: Sungwoo Um (Duke University)	Hegel's Philosophy of Science Chair: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)
3:15-4:10	"The Inconsistency of Gauthier's Market Contract"	"Observations on Hegel's 'Observing Reason'"
Speaker: Comments:	Brett Mullins (Georgia State University) Jeffrey Dunn (DePauw University)	Charles Djordjevic (Independent) Edward Beach (University of Wisconsin)
4:15-5:10	"Libertarian Paternalism and the Harm Principle"	"'Surrender to the life of the object': Hegel on Mathematical Reasoning"
Speaker: Comments:	Michael Da Silva (University of Toronto) Tait Szabo (U of Wisconsin-Washington County)	Jordan Corwin (Notre Dame University) Bernd Buldt (Indiana U-Purdue U, Ft Wayne)
5:10-6:05 Rm G21-21A	"Dialectic-speculative Logic, Formal Logic, Transcendental Logic" Angelica Nuzzo (CUNY Graduate Center)	
6:05	<i>Dinner (to be arranged informally after the sessions)</i>	

Saturday, 18 October

8:15-9	<i>Registration for IPA Conference</i>	
9-9:55 Classic Ballroom	Plenary Address “Understanding the Object/Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic and Metaphysics” Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)	
	Room 222	Room 226
	Moral Philosophy Chair: Charlene Elsby (Indiana U-Purdue U, Ft Wayne)	Feminist Philosophies Chair: Adriel Trott (Wabash College)
10-10:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Blame, Obligation, and Dignity: How to Establish Equal Second-Person Authority” Ryan Hubbard (Syracuse University) Ryan Fischbeck (Bowling Green State Univ)	“Debunking Social Constructivism” Abigail Klassen (Visiting Student - MIT) Elaine Blum (Purdue University)
11-11:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism and the Normativity Objection” Max G. Parish (University of Oklahoma) Sungwoo Um (Duke University)	“On Naturalism and Feminism in Moral Epistemology: Resolving the Challenges to an Alliance” Daniel Beck (Michigan State University) Susan Blake (Indiana University)
12-12:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Objective Probabilities of Free Choice” Leigh Vicens (Augustana University) Steven Winterfeldt (Kent State University)	“Methodological Discourse: Feminist Philosophy of Language as a Prescriptivist Ideal” Joshua Trosch (Washington Univ in St. Louis) Reyes Espinosa (Purdue University)
1-1:45	<i>Lunch and Business Meeting</i>	
1:45-2	<i>Student Awards Presentation [Room 222]</i>	
	Epistemology, Testimony and Disagreement Chair: Rob Luzewy (Independent)	Moral Philosophy Chair: Reyes Espinosa (Purdue University)
2-2:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Testimonial Traditions and Religious Disagreement” Donald Bungum (St. Louis University) Kristin Weis (Kent State University)	“Trustfulness as a Risky Virtue” Sungwoo Um (Duke University) Leigh Viner (Indiana University Southeast)
3-3:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Knowledge from Knowledge” Rodrigo Borges (Rutgers University) Matt Carlson (Wabash College)	“Taking Responsibility for Domesticated Animals” Elijah Weber (Bowling Green State University) Samuel Kahn (Indiana U-Purdue U, Indianapolis)
4-4:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Comparing Tastes: A New Problem for Relativism” Eric Snyder (Ohio State University) Jon Shaheen (Oberlin College)	“A Kantian Take on Fallible Principles and Fallible Judgments” Samuel Kahn (Indiana U-Purdue U, Indianapolis) Curtis Sommerlatte (Indiana University)

IPA Executive Officers 2014-2015:

President Bryan Hall, Indiana University Southeast
 Vice President Kevin Harrelson, Ball State University
 Secretary Kris Rhodes, Martin University

Abstracts of Presented Papers

Frege's Realism: The Truth about Beauty

The general philosophical stance advanced by Gottlob Frege has traditionally been taken to include a commitment to a variety of metaphysical theses typically associated with the label "realism"; the past few decades, however, have seen a surge of interpretations which hold that, at the core of Frege's philosophy, are commitments which are somehow opposed to realism. In this paper I argue that it is Frege's denial of realism, in connection with one domain of discourse, which not only undermines one popular argument for interpretations of the latter sort, but establishes that Frege was, in fact, a realist about truth.

On Truth and Lies in a Non-normative Sense: a reply to the inflationary argument

This paper evaluates the implications of Crispin Wright's inflationary argument for Paul Horwich's minimalist theory of truth. Wright argues that truth must be a substantive normative property, while Horwich defends the position that there is nothing more to the theory of truth than the inclination to accept all non-controversial instances of the equivalence schema 'the proposition that p is true iff p.' In this paper I argue that Horwich's deflationism can explain the facts about truth Wright appeals to in motivating the inflationary argument, and that therefore Wright's inflationary argument alone is insufficient to show that truth must be a substantive normative property.

An Husserlian Critique of McDowell's Conceptualism

In *Mind and World* McDowell attempts to chart a course between a coherentism that is undesirable because it leaves empirical judgments without external constraint and an empiricism that is undesirable because it falls prey to the myth of the given. In charting his own position, McDowell seeks to ground empirical judgments in sensory experiences without falling prey to the myth of given. To do this, he proposes that the "space of reasons" coincides with the "space of concepts" and that sensory experience is always already informed by conceptual capacities. First, I recount the motivation for and nature of McDowell's conceptualist position. Second, I argue that it fails to account sufficiently for the development of new experiences and new concepts. Third, I argue that Husserl's genetic transcendental phenomenology provides the resources to both maintain McDowell's conceptualism and account for the development of new experiences and new concepts.

The Paradox of Deterministic Probabilities

This paper aims to investigate the so-called problem of deterministic probabilities. Roughly put, it is commonly thought that probabilities play an important role in laws of nature, explanations and predictions. But in a deterministic world there is no room for such probabilities, since all probabilities are epistemic. So the challenge is to understand the role of probabilities in laws, explanations and predictions if there are no probabilities to start with. Some have proposed a solution that requires a Humean account of laws. I will argue instead that the notion of "typicality" can offer an important insight toward the solution of this paradox.

How to be a Scientific Anti-Realist

The underdetermination argument for scientific anti-realism is normally understood as an argument against the claim that we can have justified belief in our scientific theories. So understood, the argument fails, for it depends on an epistemological principle which leads to radical skepticism. However, it is possible to reapply the underdetermination argument to knowledge. In other words, the argument can be successfully used to show

that our beliefs in scientific theories do not rise to the level of knowledge, even if these beliefs are true and justified. We thus get a newer, sleeker, subtler version of scientific anti-realism: we may be able to justifiably believe our scientific theories, but we cannot know them.

Setting the Stage for a Problem with Animalism and Sparse Ontologies in Bioethics

Dean Zimmerman (2007) has suggested that if animalists want to avoid rival-candidate style objections, then they should adopt a sparse ontology. However, the adoption of such an ontology undermines the commonsense justification we use to assume that animals exist. This causes trouble for Eric Olson's Thinking Animal Argument. In this paper I explore and expand Zimmerman's Problem, and demonstrate that animalists who adopt a sparse ontology—specifically those following Peter van Inwagen, Eric Olson, and Trenton Merricks should not be confident that an animal is present if that animal lacks personal properties. Unfortunately this results in the leveling of the utility of the biological and psychological criteria as applied in bioethics.

The Inconsistency of Gauthier's Market Contractarianism

David Gauthier develops morality in the social contract tradition as an emergent property rationally necessitated by the presence of inefficiency, when the employment of individual utility maximizing strategies fails to produce optimal outcomes. To demarcate situations in which morality arises from those in which it does not, two decision criteria, Strategic Emergence and Market Emergence, are motivated and are taken to be equivalent. Following the work of Bob Bright, this paper both formalizes axiomatically and expands upon a demonstration of the inconsistency and, hence, the inequality of the two decision criteria. Eliminating each of the emergence conditions is considered, in turn, to resolve the inconsistency; however, Gauthier's approach resists such amendment as the present difficulties appear to be insurmountable.

Libertarian Paternalism and the Harm Principle

Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler's 'libertarian paternalism' has created a cottage industry for 'nudges', the key conceptual tool for implementing policies that are consistent with Sunstein and Thaler's brand of soft paternalism. Unsurprisingly, this has also occasioned a vast critical literature examining the merits of both libertarian paternalism in general and the nudge in particular. This short paper argues that, contrary to Sunstein's claims in *Why Nudge?*, J.S. Mill's Harm Principle is not the proper target for libertarian paternalist's critique of regulation.

'Surrender to the Life of the Object': Hegel on Mathematical Reasoning

In this paper I address the allegation that Hegel's critique of mathematics in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* mischaracterizes mathematical reasoning. I argue that the appearance of error is largely due to terminological and definitional practices of Hegel's that are highly variant from those common today rather than to philosophical or even mathematical confusion, and I briefly develop an account of Hegel's critique that makes him out as a coherent advocate of a broadly non-deductivist account of mathematical reasoning similar to the one that Michael Detlefsen develops out of Henri Poincaré. In closing, I contemplate a possible restriction of this broad position to a more robustly Hegelian account of such reasoning.

Observations on Hegel's 'Observing Reason'

The goal of this paper is to re-frame some of Hegel's statements in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* about natural science in a way that is more understandable by contemporary practitioners in the philosophy of natural sciences. I first outline Hegel's project. Then I reconstruct his thoughts in "Observing Reason" with a focus on laws and the nature of observation. I finally use an article by Frigg on models to show how Hegel can be applied into a contemporary debate.

Blame, Obligation, and Dignity: How to Establish Equal Second-Personal Authority

A formal contractualist account of moral obligation hinges on establishing that all persons share equal dignity. Steven Darwall has suggested that dignity is the second-personal authority shared by all persons to hold others accountable to legitimate expectations (ESPA). Since contractualism is based on the value of dignity, Darwall's project of providing a formal contractualist account of obligation hinges on his argument for establishing ESPA. Gary Watson has offered a critique of this argument, convincingly showing that it fails to establish ESPA. It thereby poses a detrimental problem for Darwall's project. The aim of this paper is to offer a solution. I do this by modifying Darwall's account of blame to include a cognitive dimension. I then demonstrate that all persons share equal dignity by showing how ESPA is a precondition for this modified account of blame. I do this by examining blame's communicative function within a framework of formal pragmatics.

Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism and the Normativity Objection

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is the view that moral goodness is a species of natural goodness. A common objection is that moral goodness cannot be a kind of natural goodness because moral goodness is normative and natural goodness is not. I call this the normativity objection. Debate about this objection is at an impasse: critics continue to press the normativity objection and Aristotelian naturalists remain unfazed by it. I argue that two tendencies in contemporary moral philosophy lead critics to frame the normativity objection in question-begging terms. This leads Aristotelian naturalists to dismiss the objection without really answering it. I attempt to move the debate forward by proposing a non-questioning begging way of framing the dispute. As a result of my proposal, the normativity objection can be reformulated in a way that avoids the quick Aristotelian naturalist dismissal, and also reveals an important explanatory gap in the contemporary Aristotelian naturalist account of moral judgment.

Objective Probabilities of Free Choice

Many proponents of libertarian freedom assume that the free choices we might make have particular objective probabilities of occurring. In this paper, I examine two common motivations for positing such probabilities: first, to account for the phenomenal character of decision-making, in which our reasons seem to have particular strengths to incline us to act, and second, to naturalize the role of reasons in influencing our decisions, such that they have a place in the causal order as we know it. I argue, however, that neither introspective reflection nor the metaphysics of causation gives us reason for thinking there are such particular objective probabilities of our free choices.

Debunking Social Constructivism

My paper examines the emancipatory potential of social constructionism (SC), asking whether and how our social categories can help to liberate categorized individuals. If social kinds/categories are constituted in part or entirely by social attitudes, then while SC frees us from "nature", "essences", and "objective reality," I ask

whether its programs merely shackle us to new forms of tyranny and, moreover, question the internal logic of their programs. My paper asks; (i) whether SC projects demonstrate that some X (a category, concept, kind) is socially constructed or if they merely presuppose that they do by, in turn, presuming that X is not inevitable, (ii) whether SC projects can lead to an interpretive regress by directing their critical attitudes against themselves, (iii) with parties each declaring their redefinition of X to be the better, whether SC emancipatory projects can simply collapse into a pernicious form of relativism, and (iv) if there exists no standard of what X is or what X should be other than what has most currency or what most believe should have the most currency, whether SC projects can actually work to reinforce the status quo. The analysis of social kinds and especially of the increasing dominance of “constructionist projects” in social sciences and humanities alike has theoretical and practical importance. The proper delineation of kinds and criteria elucidating the architecture of social kinds is worth researching since it makes clearer the function of social kinds in oppressive and emancipatory projects alike.

On Naturalism and Feminism in Moral Epistemology: Resolving the Challenges to an Alliance

Many have argued in the past for an alliance between naturalism and feminism in epistemology, and some have extended this alliance to particular issues in moral epistemology. Yet, several obstacles still exist that keep some naturalistically inclined philosophers from embracing feminist influences—and vice versa. These challenges include the following worries: that feminist moral epistemology biases its results by overtly embracing a political perspective, that naturalists overly valorize scientific knowledge at the expense of other forms of knowledge, and that naturalists overly emphasize the individual as agent of knowledge at the expense of the active role of the community in knowledge production. In this essay, I approach each one of these challenges by providing reasons for why the opposing camp should overcome them and embrace the alliance between feminism and naturalism in moral epistemology.

Methodological Discourse: Feminist Philosophy of Language as a Prescriptivist Ideal

This essay was written in response to a prompt concerning the extent to which feminist philosophy of language might inherently conflict with linguistics if one entertains the notion that linguistics aims to be scientific. In this way, it attempts to draw a parallel between feminist philosophy of language and a very basic interpretation of a philosophy of science. In testing this parallel, this essay attempts to define both in terms of a prescriptivist ideal. The result is a case for a feminist philosophy of language that derives its theoretical bearing from its practical, lingual utility rather than a more conventional, normative appeal.

Testimonial Traditions and Religious Disagreement

Recently, some philosophers have argued that the testimonial basis for religious beliefs neutralizes the skeptical threat arising from religious disagreement. In this essay, however, I argue that the testimonial basis itself poses a skeptical threat to religious beliefs. Being a recipient of religious testimony requires being socially situated within an investigative practice, but few persons are socially situated so as to receive all or most of the relevant evidence contained in such practices. I contend that disputants who acquire their religious beliefs through religious testimony rationally ought to suspend belief when faced with religious disagreement, since they are forced to withhold belief concerning the adequacy of their own epistemic position. I conclude that the very same feature of religious testimony—its tradition specificity—that undermines the peer argument for religious skepticism lends support to the skeptical argument presented herein.

Knowledge from Knowledge

The paper makes a case for the knowledge from knowledge principle (KFK): S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions p depends on. According to KFK, a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions one's knowledge depend on. In this paper I present what I take to be the main reasons to accept KFK (§1), consider an objection to the principle (§2), and situate the principle in a broader normative context (§3).

Comparing Tastes: A New Problem for Relativism

The debate over so-called predicates of personal taste (PPTs) like 'tasty' and 'fun' has been of central importance in the Philosophy of Language and Linguistic Semantics for over a decade now. On the philosophical side, PPTs pose the following puzzle: How can we disagree over what's tasty when it seems that we can't be wrong about what's tasty? The semantic puzzle is this: How to model the fact that PPTs are "subjective" in some interesting sense when ascriptions of tastiness allow for disagreement? Two main contenders have emerged, Contextualism and Relativism. Unfortunately, the debate over PPTs has tended to focus exclusively on PPTs in the positive form like 'tasty' in (1a), largely ignoring comparative PPTs like 'tastier' in (1b):

- a. Cake is tasty.
- b. Cake is tastier than pie.

I'm going to argue that comparative PPTs alone present strong evidence in favor of Contextualism. That's because Relativism cannot make semantic sense of comparatives like (2a,b):

- a. Cake is tastier for Mary than for Fred.
- b. Mary finds cake tastier than Fred does.

These rather surprisingly reveal that Relativism is inconsistent with certain basic assumptions of standard accounts of gradable adjectives within Linguistic Semantics.

Trustfulness as a Risky Virtue

After Annette Baier's seminal works on trust, there have been a considerable number of studies on this important topic. Most of these studies, however, have focused on trust or trustworthiness. In contrast, there has been little, if any, study on trustfulness as the trait of a person who trusts well or wisely, that is, a good truster's virtue. This silence is almost strange, especially considering the relational nature of trust: a desirable trust relationship is one in which the trustee is trustworthy and the truster is trustful. No matter how trustworthy the trustee is, the relationships would be defective at best, if the truster's attitude is, say, distrustful or credulous; that is, if the truster does not have the virtue of trustfulness, trustworthy people may be left distrusted and untrustworthy people trusted. Thus, trustfulness is at least as important as trustworthiness for desirable trust relationship. My aim in this paper is to shed some light on the nature and value of this neglected but important virtue of trustfulness. First, I briefly introduce the nature of trust and trust relationships and explain why they are essentially risky. Second, I examine the nature of trustfulness mainly by comparing it with other traits such as distrustfulness, credulity, and prudent reliance. I then argue that its attitudinal element of respecting the trustee's free will and caring about her as a person is what distinguishes trustfulness from other traits. I also show why trustfulness is not only intrinsically admirable but also necessary for building a harmonious community. I finish this paper with some further remarks on trustfulness that might help understanding this virtue.

Taking Responsibility for Domesticated Animals

Clare Palmer has recently argued that nearly all humans have special obligations to assist domesticated animals (Palmer 2011). Further, she contends, most humans have these special obligations, because most humans benefit from the institution of domestication in some way. I argue that Palmer's analysis fails to establish this conclusion, and offer an alternative account of who bears special obligations to assist domesticated animals. I argue that it is only by taking responsibility for the vulnerability of a domesticated animal that one acquires special obligations to assist. So while there are special obligations to assist domesticated animals, it is not the case that most humans have these obligations.

A Kantian take on fallible principles and fallible judgments

In this paper I offer a Kantian take on fallible principles and fallible judgments. I begin by observing that, according to Kant, if an agent acts according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that s/he ought as far as morality is concerned. In addition, I point out that Kant thinks that agents can be mistaken in their subjective determinations of their duties. That is, I point out that Kant thinks it is possible for an agent to believe that some action X is right even though it is an objective truth that X is not right; according to Kant, agents do not have infallible knowledge of right and wrong. The point of the paper is to determine whether Kant's ethics is defensible on this front. I do this by looking at the blameworthiness of acting contrary to fallible knowledge and the blamelessness of acting according to fallible judgment.