



Indiana Philosophical Association
Kentucky Philosophical Association
 Spring 2023 Joint Conference
 Brescia University
 Owensboro, KY
 March 31—April 1, 2023



Meeting Program

Friday, 31 March	Session A Field Center 212	Session B Field Center 312
1:00-1:45	<i>Registration & Refreshments – Field Center, First Floor (next to the Art Gallery)</i>	
1:45	<i>Welcome – Duffy Auditorium</i>	
2:00-3:45	The Meaning of Life Chair:	Social & Political Philosophy Chair:
2:00-2:50 Speaker: Commentator:	Should philosophers go to war with poets? Dr. Richard Gunderman, IU Dr. Dan Hartner, Rose Hulman Institute of Technology	A Case of Unraveling DNA & Identity: The Test-Taking Experience of Tomi Makanjuola Eve Carlisle Polley, University of Louisville Matthew Pinalto, Eastern Kentucky University
2:55-3:45 Speaker: Commentator:	Collective Mortality and the Point of Living Matthew Pinalto, Eastern Kentucky University	On the Natural Rights of Those Without the Use of Reason: Francisco De Vitoria Against the Spanish Conquistadors Dr. Scott Williams, University of North Carolina, Asheville Ana C. Gomez, Purdue
4:00-6:00	Keynote Field Center – Duffy Auditorium Chair: Dr. Beau Branson, Brescia University	
	“Dethroning Aquinas” Dr. Richard Cross, Notre Dame	
Saturday, 1 April	Session A Field Center 212	Session B Field Center 312
8:30-9:00	<i>Registration</i>	
9:00-12:00	Metaethics Chair:	Metaphysics & Epistemology Chair:
9:00-9:50 Speaker: Commentator:	Blame as non-acquiescence: advancing Scanlon's account Seungsoo Lee, The Ohio State University Benjamin Allan Elmore, Purdue	Explaining why the grounding relation holds James Ewing, University of Illinois Urbana Champaign Ethan Walker, IU
9:55-10:45	Is there anything wrong with adaptive	Loving well and knowing better: an epistemic

Speaker: Commentator:	preferences? Ariadne Dubus, Binghamton University Joshua Pascal, IU	aspect of love Trevor Adams, University of Nebraska Luke Capek, IU
10:50-11:45 Speaker: Commentator:	The philosophical problem of business ethics Dr. Dan Hartner, Rose Hulman Institute of Technology James Ewing, University of Illinois Urbana Champaign	Bare particulars and cosmology Youssef Aguisoul, University of Lisbon
12:00-1:15	Lunch & Business Meetings	
1:30-3:15	Philosophy of Religion Chair: Seungsoo Lee, The Ohio State University	History of Philosophy Chair: Ariadne Dubus, Binghamton University
1:30-2:20 Speaker: Commenter:	Prophecy, Fate, and Freedom in <i>God of War</i> Dr. Charles Joshua Horn, University of Wisconsin, Steven's Point Landon D. C. Elkind, Western Kentucky Univ.	Anne Conway's Account of Divine and Christly Freedom Nick Louzon, University of Illinois Urbana Champaign Brian M. Johnson, Purdue
2:25-3:15 Speaker: Commenter:	Against the Aloneness Argument Jacob Huls, St. Louis University James Pepe, St. Louis University	Russell's "Vagueness" Revisited Landon D. C. Elkind, Western Kentucky Univ. Youssef Aguisoul, University of Lisbon
3:30-5:15	Plenary Session – Undergraduate Presentations Chair: Dr. Jeffrey Gower, Wabash College	
3:30-4:20 Speaker: Commentator:	The Importance of a World Without Purpose Chelsea Schwartz, IUPUI Carson Price, Wabash College	
4:25-5:15 Speaker: Commentator:	Scientific Proof for Absolutism and Eternalism Kate Krogen	

IPA Executive Officers 2022-23

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Registration and Venue Information

Registration: Registration will occur in-person at the conference. The registration fee is \$30. Cash only.

Hotel recommendations

[Hampton Inn & Suites Downtown Owensboro/Waterfront](#)

401 West 2nd Street
Owensboro, KY 42301

[Holiday Inn Owensboro Riverfront](#)

701 West 1st Street,
Owensboro, KY 42301

Driving Information: Brescia is about a 10-15-minute walk from those hotels, but any of the locations marked “P” on the campus map are parking lots that visitors can use. After noon on Friday, most students and faculty should be cleared out. There is also street parking all around, all of which is free and no permits are required.

[Click here](#) for a **Campus Map**. We will be in the C.E. Field Center for Professional Studies, which is #6 among the orange colored Academic / Administrative buildings on the map.

Abstracts of Papers

Keynote: **Richard Cross, Dethroning Aquinas**

Trevor Adams, Loving well and knowing better: an epistemic aspect of love: Some philosophers have argued that interpersonal love, due to the partiality we show to those we love, demands we forgo epistemically responsible belief formation for the sake of those we love. For example, some philosophers reference friendship as a type of relationship that requires we be epistemically irresponsible (Keller 2004, Stroud 2006). In this paper I will be arguing that when we love someone, if we love them well, then we actually better our epistemic position with regards to our beloved. My argument hinges on the idea that how well we love someone comes on a spectrum from better to worse and that we improve our epistemic position the closer we get to the ideal form of love. First, I will demonstrate that love gives us a disposition to pay a special kind of attention to the beloved. Next, I will show that this special kind of attention gives us instrumental reasons to pay more accurate attention to those we love. Furthermore, the nature of love itself requires us to pay accurate attention because too much delusion or partiality may undermine the very love we are attempting to exhibit. After I state and explain this argument I will be briefly considering a central objection to my view.

Youssef Aguisoul, Bare particulars and cosmology: Bare particularism (BP) is the view that material objects are constituted by universals and bare particulars (Constituent Thesis). These particulars are supposed to “individuate” their objects (Individuating Thesis) and to “have” their objects’ universals (Having Thesis). A recent objection to BP has it that if Having Thesis then the world is overpopulated. In this paper, I show that this objection isn’t effective. Bare particularists can modify Having Thesis to avoid overpopulation. Then I propose a new objection to BP, according to which if Big Bang cosmology, and if

Having Thesis, then every object in the cosmos comprises “one” and the same bare particular, in which case all objects are numerically identical. This consequence allows us to refute Individuating Thesis and thereof BP. Finally, I conclude by answering some objections.

Ariadne Dubus, Is there anything wrong with adaptive preferences?: In his paper, “Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences,” Ben Colburn claims that adaptive preference formation is bad because it undermines our autonomy. He argues that the way in which an agent’s autonomy is undermined is by covert influence, namely, an influence of which the agent is necessarily unaware. Adaptive preference formation is necessarily covert, so always harmful. This paper will oppose Coburn’s notion that the nature of adaptive preference is harmful in any serious sense. I argue that if an agent is making choices consistent with her values, and living a flourishing life, we need not be concerned with influences. I then claim that adaptive preference formation is only harmful in instances where the preference contributes to an individual’s oppression, and therefore, inhibits that individual’s ability to flourish.

Landon D. C. Elkind, Russell’s “Vagueness” Revisited: I argue that Bertrand Russell’s 1923 “Vagueness” has wrongly endured long-standing criticism in the secondary literature on metaphysical vagueness. I divide the most common criticisms of Russell into three ‘myths’, as I call them. I then indicate why none of these three myths is justified by the light of a close reading of Russell’s 1923 piece. The upshot of dispelling the myths is inviting work on representationalism, the view that metaphysical vagueness is a feature of representations.

James Ewing, Explaining why the grounding relation holds: The grounding relation has received much attention in the metaphysics literature during the past decade. This paper will be concerned with two grounding principles, each of which give an answer to the following question: why does the grounding relation hold? Many theorists, including Kit Fine, Gideon Rosen, and Shamik Dasgupta, accept a grounding principle that explains why the grounding relation holds by appealing to the essence of the grounded entity. It is the goal of this paper to challenge this acceptance by showing there is another principle, one that appeals to the essence of the grounding entity, that is just as plausible. If my argument succeeds, it has the potential to uproot some of what has been taken for granted in much contemporary grounding literature.

Richard Gunderman, Should philosophers go to war with poets?: Plato’s Republic is often misinterpreted as advocating an outright ban or at least severe censorship of poets, especially the most beloved of all Greek poets, Homer, and the first and greatest epic in Western literature, the Iliad. In fact, however, the Republic is not intended to be a perfect city, but merely as perfectly just a “city in speech” as possible. By reading the Republic and the Iliad in tandem, we realize that the Republic represents less a political prescription than a sustained inquiry into human nature, highlighting many of the essential attributes that render the Republic practically impossible and the Iliad one of the most beautiful accounts of what is truly at stake in human life.

Dan Hartner, The philosophical problem of business ethics: The central task of business ethics is to furnish a normative account of the function of business—carried out in contemporary form by the modern corporation—in our society. Standardly, the normative theories of business ethics include Friedman’s (1970/2008) shareholder theory, Freeman’s (1984/2008) stakeholder theory, and various versions of the social contract theory, including Heath’s (2008) market failures model. It is widely held that all three approaches regard business ethics as a proper subset of professional ethics. Drawing

on the leading normative account of the professions, this paper argues that the attempt to professionalize business in this way misunderstands the unique functional role of the professions and thereby wrongly substitutes personal moral commitment for genuine organizational ethics. Business ethics is not a form of professional ethics.

Charles Joshua Horn, Prophecy, Fate, and Freedom in *God of War*: Philosophers and theologians have considered the nature of prophecy and developed complex solutions to the apparent incompatibility between freedom and foreknowledge. This essay will consider some of the historical solutions to the problem of prophecy (Boethius's timeless eternity, Molina's view of Middle Knowledge view, and Ockhamism) and argue that only Ockhamism is intelligible in the context of the video game series.

Jacob Huls, Against the Aloneness Argument: Ryan Mullins and Joseph Schmid have recently advanced what they dub the "aloneness argument" against divine simplicity.¹ Their argument assumes both that God is omniscient and is free not to create, and they deduce from these (and some other allegedly plausible premises) that divine simplicity is false. In this paper, I respond to their argument. I begin by summarizing a recent characterization of divine simplicity proffered by Eleonore Stump, and then I explain Mullins's and Schmid's aloneness argument against divine simplicity. In the next section, I argue that one of the premises of the aloneness argument is plausibly false if divine simplicity is true, and so the aloneness argument faces a dire dialectical issue. Finally, I answer some potential criticisms of my response.

Kate Krogen, Scientific Proof for Absolutism and Eternalism: Various philosophical perspectives of space and time are explored in this paper. Specifically, the combination of absolutism and eternalism is proved using Special Relativity. The concept of chirality and the B-theorist perspective are main points of evidence. Much of the argument is derived from the writing of Le Poudevin, as well as from a class forum about absolute space. The works of Mermin and Ney are significant to the time argument. The three main discoveries of Special Relativity (time dilation, length contraction, and the simultaneity of events) are emphasized when connecting the physics and philosophy of space-time. Space is proven to be absolute and time is proven to be eternalist, and this paper explains why the ontologies of space and time must be linked

Seungsoo Lee, Blame as non-acquiescence: advancing Scanlon's account: T. M. Scanlon's account of blame is now a classic. A crucial feature of his account is that several of its central tenets repeatedly employ the notion of appropriateness. It is those tenets that underlie his elegant explanations of why we should blame even if determinism is true, of moral luck, of why blame can appropriately diminishes over time, of the appropriateness of silent blame, etc. The problem however is that no substantial characterization is being provided of the notion of appropriateness, making the tenets—and thus his elegant explanations—obscure and unconvincing. The aim of this paper is to advance (or develop a novel account of blame based on) Scanlon's account by fleshing out the notion of appropriateness in a way that would render each of the tenets vivid and plausible. I will propose, roughly, to construe the notion of appropriateness in terms of non-acquiescence in others' past actions.

Nick Louzon, Anne Conway's Account of Divine and Christly Freedom: In her comments regarding freedom, Anne Conway claims that indifference of will is the basis for all mutability. Since creatures can change either to good or to bad, indifference of will must be the basis for both change to good and change to bad. If indifference of will is the basis for change to bad, then one might think that possession of an indifferent will must imply the possibility of sin or wrongdoing. But the claim that an indifferent

will implies the possibility of wrongdoing is in tension with Christ's freedom. As a mutable being, Christ must be indifferently willed. And as Conway's second substance, Christ cannot possibly change to bad. But if Christ is indifferently willed, Christ can possibly change to bad. Ergo, tension. This paper will explore Jonathan Head's recent interpretation of Conway that is unable to resolve this tension and suggest an alternative reading.

Matthew Pinalto, Collective Mortality and the Point of Living: People sometimes declare that death—both personal death and our collective mortality as a species—makes everything we do pointless. This seems to many others like an overreaction. However, given that much of what we care about seems to presuppose the continuation of human life, it may seem like the pessimists have a point. In this essay, I try to motivate the worry about our collective mortality for naturalist (or secular) worldviews. I then consider the merits and limitations of some common responses to this worry in the recent literature on meaning in life, which emphasize moderating our standards or changing our goals in ways that insulate them from death. I suggest that Viktor Frankl's views about the permanence of the past offers a different and perhaps better way of framing and responding to the worry that death renders our lives and achievements meaningless.

Eve Carlisle Polley, A Case of Unraveling DNA & Identity: The Test-Taking Experience of Tomi Makanjuola: The advent of DNA ancestry testing motivated a dynamic burst of human activities that constitute a scientific-technological-industrial-personal-social movement of immense scale, infused with varied and significant epistemological and ethical questions. The problematics that arise when we consider the definitions, boundaries, and intersections of human individual- personal and communal-social identities through the perspectives of genetics, impact not only how we understand ourselves and the nature or composition of society but also have profound practical-applied impacts. This paper, situated within a larger research project, focuses on the experience of one person who took such a test and reported some of its effects on her thinking and behavior. Through the analyses of such cases, reaching for empathetic understandings of individuals and societal patterns, too—and bringing to bear relevant philosophical theories about human identity and being—what can be learned? Furthermore, how ought we act with regards to its impacts, both present and potential?

Chelsea Schwartz, The Importance of a World Without Purpose: What does it mean to live an authentic life? In this paper, I will explore this question by first outlining an idea of what authenticity means in regard to human life. I will do by looking at the philosophies of two French revolutionary thinkers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Guy Debord. First, I will define existentialism according to Sartre and through this, address his idea of authenticity as an existential virtue. I will then look at the philosophy of Guy Debord, specifically through the work of Debord while he was active in an organization known as Situationist International and subsequently outline the relevance of this work to modern society. It is through the analysis of these two views related to 20th century existentialism that I will show a way to incorporate the notion of authenticity into our navigation through 21st century life and the current state of consumerism.

Scott Williams, On the Natural Rights of Those Without the Use of Reason: Francisco De Vitoria Against the Spanish Conquistadors: By the mid-16th century the Spanish empire had been in the Americas for decades. Spanish conquistadors subjugated American Indians through warfare, extreme cruelty, and genocide. Having learned about these events, Francisco De Vitoria examined the legal and moral basis of the Spanish cause in the Americas. In his famous text, *Lecture on the American Indians*, he defended the natural rights of the American Indians and argued on legal grounds that the Spanish

crowns did not have a just basis (or “title”) for their aggression against the American Indians. In this lecture he discussed the theoretical case of whether individuals without the use of reason have any natural rights. He denied that American Indians lacked the use of reason, but argued that even if they didn’t have the use of reason, they still had natural rights that must be respected by the Spanish. What has gone unnoticed is that De Vitoria had a keen interest in the topic of those ‘without the use of reason’ (amentes) and wrote another lecture, which has not been discussed nor translated, called, *To What is a Human Held who Comes to the Use of Reason*. In this paper, I survey De Vitoria’s detailed account of what the lack of the use of reason amounts to, and then suggest how this account supported his claim in *Lecture on the American Indians* that those without the use of reason have natural rights. After comparing De Vitoria’s account with Eva Feder Kittay’s account of our moral obligations to those with profound intellectual disabilities, I conclude that De Vitoria, like Kittay, is deeply concerned about the plight of those without the use of reason, whoever they may be.