

Indiana Philosophical Association
Fall Meeting, 1989
Franklin College
Franklin, Indiana
November 4, 1989

Schedule

- 9:30 Coffee and conversation
10:00 Jan A. Cover: "Leibnizian Essentialism and Transworld Identity"
11:00 Martin Schoenfeld: "The Failure of Schopenhauer's Metaphysics"
12:00 Business Meeting
12:30 Lunch
2:00 Brian Garrett: "Can there be Vague Identity Statements?"
3:00 Kevin Possin: "Ethical Argumentation"

Directions to the Campus

The accompanying map will be useful in finding your way to the Campus Center (#19), which you should enter from the west. We shall be meeting in the Alumni Lounge, which is on the top floor at the west end of the building. Franklin College is roughly two miles west of I-65 (Use exit #90) and two miles east of Indiana 31. If you approach from 31, you will be on Highway 44 east, shown as Jefferson Street on the map provided. If you approach from I-65, you will be on Highway 44 west and on Forsythe Street. In either case, use the large parking lot shown in the foreground of the map. Although parking is restricted, it will not be enforced on Saturday.

ABSTRACTS

Jan Cover: Leibnizian Essentialism and Transworld Identity
Received views of Leibniz' metaphysic include the following as a standard entry: Leibniz denies transworld identity (TWI) for individual substances, because every property in an individual's complete concept is essential to that individual. I argue that Leibniz can consistently regard the entire history of a monad as essential to it while still (a) allowing for TWI and (b) being a counterpart theorist about de re modality. After sketching the standard account, I consider and reject three arguments [from (i) relational properties, (ii) harmonious correspondence, and (iii) natural laws] that might be offered in its defense. I conclude by explaining why Leibniz is a counterpart theorist.

Martin Schoenfeld: The Failure of Schopenhauer's Metaphysics

This paper suggests there exists a fundamental inconsistency in the philosophical system Schopenhauer develops in The World as Will and Representation. This inconsistency is constituted by an illicit conjunction of a transcendental epistemology and a transcendental metaphysics. The author wants to show that this