

JOINT MEETING OF THE INDIANA PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE MIDWEST STUDY GROUP OF THE NORTH AMERICAN KANT SOCIETY

Spring 2013 Meeting - 8 and 9 March

Indiana University Southeast
New Albany, Indiana
University Center, Lower Level, Hoosier Rooms East and West

Meeting Program

Friday, 8 March

	Indiana Philosophical Association Hoosier Room West	North American Kant Society Hoosier Room East
11-11:45	<i>Registration</i>	
11:45-12	<i>Welcome by Vice Chancellor Curt Peters (Hoosier Room East)</i>	
	Early Modern Chair: J. Barry (Indiana University Southeast)	Session I Chair: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)
12-12:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Descartes on Color Eliminativism and Color Representation” Saja Parvizian (University of Illinois, Chicago) Samuel Kahn (IUPUI)	“The Soul as Two-Sided Illusion” Courtney Morris (U of California, Riverside)
1-1:55 Speaker: Comments:	“Spinoza’s Ethical Objectivism” Andrew Youpa (Southern Illinois, Carbondale) Saja Parvizian (University of Illinois, Chicago)	“Existence and Indexicality: On Kant’s Thesis that Being is Positing and Not a Predicate” Matthew Rukgaber (Eastern Connecticut State)
1:55-2:15	<i>Break with Refreshments (Hoosier Room West)</i>	
	Ethics Chair: Rega Wood (Indiana University Bloomington)	Session II Chair: Corey Dyck (University of Western Ontario)
2:15-3:10 Speaker: Comments:	“The Sincerity of Valuing: Honesty as a Nietzschean Value Standard” Aaron Harper (West Liberty University) Leigh Viner (Indiana University Southeast)	“Possible and Actual Universality of Judgments of Taste” Amrit Heer (Villanova University)
3:15-4:10 Speaker: Comments:	“Asymmetry in Responsibility for Omissions: A Reply to Clarke’s Explanation” Albert Hu (University of Tennessee) Tait Szabo (Wisconsin- Washington County)	“Sensus Communis and Temporality in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” Kenneth Noe (Southern Illinois, Carbondale)
4:15-5:10 Speaker: Comments:	“Four Arguments Against Julia Driver’s Metaphysics of Virtue” Robert Hartman (St. Louis University) Scott Forschler (St. Cloud Tech & Comm College)	“Kant’s Philosophy of Time in the Transcendental Aesthetic” Oliver Thorndike (Johns Hopkins University)
5:10-5:20	<i>Break</i>	
5:20-6:45	Keynote Address, Hoosier Room East “The Independence of Right from Ethics” Allen Wood, Indiana University, Bloomington	
7-9	Dinner, Bank Street Brewhouse (415 Bank St. New Albany, IN 47150)	

Saturday, 9 March

	Indiana Philosophical Association Hoosier Room West	North American Kant Society Hoosier Room East
8:15-9	<i>Registration (Continental Breakfast in Hoosier Room West)</i>	
	Philosophy of Language/Religion Chair: Eric Dalton (University of Southern Indiana)	Session III Chair: Tait Szabo (Univ of Wisconsin-Washington County)
9-9:55	“Remarks on Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth” Speaker: Justin Remhof (University of Illinois) Comments: Joshua Mills-Knutsen (Indiana Univ Southeast)	“Kant and the Duty to Act from Duty” Michael Walschots (U of Western Ontario)
10-10:55	“Truth We Can Aim At: Deflationism and Objective Norms of Assertion” Speaker: Griffin Klemick (Northern Illinois University) Comments: Kris Rhodes (Martin University)	“Experiments in Ethics? Kant on Chemistry and Practical Philosophy” Martin Sticker (University of St. Andrews)
11-11:55	“Skeptical Theism on Pain and Pleasure- A Response to Draper” Speaker: Jim Elliot (Purdue University) Comments: Travis Derico (Indiana University Southeast)	“Kant’s Conception of Humanity in the Groundwork” Zeyu Chi (Georgia State University)
12-1:45	<i>Lunch and Business Meeting (Hoosier Room West)</i>	
1:45-2	<i>Student Awards Presentation (Hoosier Room West)</i>	
	Epistemology/Philosophy of Mind Chair: George Harvey (Indiana University Southeast)	Session IV Chair: Curtis Sommerlatte (Indiana University Bloomington)
2-2:55	“Fallibilism and Epistemic Luck” Speaker: Gregory Stoutenburg (University of Iowa) Comments: Mark Satta (Purdue University)	“To Suspend Finitude Itself: Hegel’s Early Reaction to Kant’s First Antinomy” Reed Winegar (Fordham University)
3-3:55	“Transmission Failure and Factive Warrants” Speaker: Ian Schnee (Western Kentucky University) Comments: Gregory Stoutenburg (University of Iowa)	“A Kantian Argument for Sovereignty Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Krista Thomason (Swarthmore College)
4-4:55	“The Mental is not Physical” Speaker: Irwin Goldstein (Davidson College) Comments: Jared Bates (Hanover College)	

Abstracts of Presented Papers

“Asymmetry in Responsibility for Omissions: A Reply to Clarke’s Explanation,” Albert Hu,
University of Tennessee

There are two groups of omission cases in which the agent could not have performed the relevant act. They are intuitively different from each other with respect to whether the agent is responsible for the omission in question, even though the omission could not have failed to occur in both cases. Sloth and Sharks can be seen as the paradigm cases representing each group respectively. Randolph Clarke [2011] proposes a principle called INTAB to explain this difference. Fischer and Ravizza would reply that INTAB cannot explain our different intuitions about responsibility in Sloth and Sharks, because INTAB only points to a morally irrelevant difference

between them. In this paper, I show that INTAB needs to be modified in the face of two preliminary criticisms. Then, I provide further support for Fischer and Ravizza's criticism by proposing a case called Fake Sharks.

"Descartes on Color Eliminativism and Color Representation," Saja Parvizia, University of Illinois, Chicago
It is widely accepted that Descartes is an eliminativist about colors in bodies. As the story goes, Descartes expels color from the mechanistic realm of extension, transferring them into the immaterial mind where they enjoy secondary quality status through being instantiated in sensations. In this paper I argue that Descartes' color eliminativism is much more radical. I engage an oft-neglected passage from Descartes' *Conversation with Burman* to show that Descartes' fundamental position on the status of color is that colors are not properties. This implies that colors are completely uninstantiated – they aren't properties of physical or mental substance. So then what explains our experience of color? I show that Descartes can account for color representation – without granting color any ontological status – by reducing it to various facts about our sensory and innate mental faculties.

"Existence and Indexicality: On Kant's Thesis that Being is Positing and Not a Predicate," Matthew Rukgaber, Eastern Connecticut State University
This paper attributes to Kant a phenomenalism in which the existence of sensible objects outside of the mind is metaphysically dependent on the first-person, essentially-indexical, intuitive perspective of a consciousness. My argument proceeds by investigating what Kant means when he says that existence is not a predicate and is, instead, the positing of a thing itself. I maintain that existence for Kant is not any sort of predicate and is not equivalent to existential quantification. I maintain that what he calls "absolute positing" is neither an epistemic nor a semantic notion. Instead, absolute positing is identical to being and identifies as ontologically primary the essentially indexical component of subjectivity that is embedded within intuition. Just as a world of intelligible objects is the external correlate created by divine intellectual intuition, so also is the world of sensible objects the external correlate of the perspective that the sensible intuitive mind introduces. The instantiation of the human perspective creates a present moment and a determinate place within an otherwise indeterminate manifold that can only be understood as the mere possibility of an objective world.

"Experiments in Ethics? Kant on Chemistry and Practical Philosophy," Martin Sticker, University of St. Andrews
My paper discusses the methodology of Kant's practical philosophy. It focuses on two neglected and puzzling passages in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. 5:92 and 5:163, where Kant claims that ethics should proceed in analogy to chemical experiments. I will start my investigation by clarifying Kant's conception of the chemical experiment. Chemistry is an experimental method of decomposition and recombination. I will then interpret the two passages in question, and finally I will apply the analogy of the chemical experiment to the *Analytic* of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. I will conclude that the analogy to chemical experiments should be understood as a way of investigating common reasoning about morally relevant subject matters. Kant's methodological commitment is in line with his emphasis on common human reason or common rational cognition in the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The analogue of chemical experiments is, according to Kant, a method to confirm that his philosophical theory cashes out ideas that are not alien to ordinary rational agents.

"Fallibilism and Epistemic Luck," Gregory Stoutenburg, University of Iowa
Epistemologists seek an anti-luck epistemology that is more-or-less compatible with ordinary intuitions about knowledge. I criticize a modal analysis of luck and epistemic luck in order to argue that epistemological fallibilists are committed to the view that knowledge can be gained through the 'bad' kind of epistemic luck. Seekers of a plausible anti-luck epistemology therefore ought to be infallibilists.

“Four Arguments Against Julia Driver’s Metaphysics of Virtue,” Robert Hartman, St. Louis University
Julia Driver has recently developed one of the most powerful contemporary utilitarian accounts of virtue. According to her, a virtue is a character trait that systematically produces good states of affairs. If her account of virtue is plausible, it would constitute a significant achievement for utilitarian theorists, because virtues and vices are important features of our moral lives and yet many utilitarian theorists fail to provide an account of virtue and vice. Nevertheless, I will argue that her account of virtue is contrary to several pre-theoretical intuitions about virtue and vice. Other dominant theories of virtue are able to accommodate those intuitions. Thus, I aim to show that there are at least four intuitions with respect to which Driver’s account of virtue is less plausible than other major accounts of virtue.

“Kant and the Duty to Act from Duty,” Michael Walschots, University of Western Ontario
Commentators such as W. D. Ross, Henry Allison, and Robert Pippin have suggested that in the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant seems to claim that we have a duty to act from duty. In this paper I argue that there is no such duty, for Kant, by attempting to clarify his notion of the general “obligation of virtue [*Tugendverpflichtung*]” (6:410), as well as the nature of the duty to cultivate one’s own will (see 6:387), which are the two positions that, at first glance, suggest we have a duty to act from duty.

“Kant’s Conception of Humanity in the Groundwork,” Zeyu Chi, Georgia State University
In this paper I argue for a new reading of the concept of humanity that Kant uses in the *Groundwork*, which considers “humanity” as the capacity to appraise one’s maxims from the perspective of pure reason. This reading is different from the dominant reading of “humanity”, which takes “humanity” to mean the capacity for setting ends. The reason that most commentators interpret “humanity” this way is because Kant defines “humanity” as the capacity to set ends in *The Metaphysics of Morals*. I suggest that Kant uses “humanity” differently in his different works, and the dominant reading is flawed for it does not offer a clear explanation for what it means to use humanity as mere means. Without necessary explanation it is unclear how humanity can serve as the limiting condition for all arbitrary ends, as Kant claims it must. The problem with the dominant reading, I suggest, partly derives from separating the humanity formula from the universal law formula and taking the latter as a formal test applied in practical deliberation. However, the universal law formula should not be seen as an abstract tool for the “derivation” of morally right maxims. Instead, it is a formula that brings into our attention a higher perspective of reason, which enables us to appraise our maxims regardless of their bearing on our happiness. The humanity formula preserves the insight of the universal law formula by tracing the capacity of moral appraisal back to the nature of pure practical reason. According to my reading, humanity is used as mere means whenever we prioritize happiness over that of our desert to be happy in our practice of moral judgment. Further, the new reading highlights Kant’s predominant concern with the moral appraisal of common human reason, which the other readings largely overlook.

“Kant’s Philosophy of Time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*,” Oliver Thorndike, Johns Hopkins University
Kant’s apriority argument holds that it is possible to represent time independently of empirical objects existing in time. It stands at the center of Kant’s thesis that time is a mere subjective form of human cognition. This paper analyzes Kant’s apriority argument as a response to an intricate network of both major and minor figures participating in the philosophical/scientific debate on space and time. Whereas Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten and Maass defend a relative notion of time, Newton, Clark, Euler, Lambert, and Crusius understand time as absolute. In particular, the paper shows that Kant’s apriority argument is not only compatible with the Newtonian conception of absolute time, but that it presupposes it. This entails that, in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Kant does not establish the apriority of time independently of the Newtonian conception of absolute time. In this context, this paper looks at various strategies to defend Kant’s apriority argument against Maass’ objection and concludes that it cannot be defended within the restrictions of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*.

“A Kantian Argument for Sovereignty Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” Krista Thomason, Swarthmore College
Kant’s non-voluntarist conception of political obligation has led some philosophers to argue that he would reject self-government rights for indigenous peoples. Some recent scholarship suggests, however, that Kant’s critique of colonialism provides an argument in favor of granting self-government rights. Here I argue for a stronger conclusion: Kantian political theory not only can but must include sovereignty for indigenous peoples. Normally these rights are considered redress for historic injustice. On a Kantian view, however, I argue that they are not remedial. Sovereignty rights are a necessary part of establishing perpetual peace. By failing to acknowledge the sovereignty of native groups, states once guilty of imperialism leave open the in principle possibility for future violence, even though no current conflict exists. Only in recognizing self-government rights can states truly commit to the cosmopolitan ideal.

“The Mental is Not Physical,” Irwin Goldstein, Davidson College

Materialists think the mental is physical. Today, materialists are neural materialists. They strive to subsume the mental within the physical scientist’s ontology. In this paper I show the mental is not physical. Pains, thoughts and other mental states are different from physical events in the brain. Neural materialism is false. In recent decades materialists have regularly embraced and relied upon the possibility of there being *a posteriori* identities. These are identities that can be learned of only from experience. As scientists discovered the morning star is the evening star, so people may discover pain is some physical event in the brain. In this paper I argue that there are no such identities and so no identity between mental states and physical events in the brain that can only be learned of through empirical research.

“Possible and Actual Universality of Judgments of Taste in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment,”

Amrit Heer, Villanova University

I lay the groundwork for an interpretation of Kant’s claim, in the section on the ‘Antinomy of Taste’ in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, that judgments of taste, and their universality, are grounded on an indeterminate concept of the supersensible substratum. In order to understand Kant’s claim, it is necessary to make a distinction between the grounds of the possibility of the universality of judgments of taste and the conditions for the actualization of this universality. This paper argues for such a distinction. I first offer a reading of the Antinomy, where I contest interpretations that this section either merely completes the task of the Deduction – to justify the demand for universal assent to a judgment of taste on the basis of an *a priori* principle – or introduces a distinct problem unrelated to grounding this universality. Instead, I argue that the Deduction establishes what it sought, to ground the *possibility* of universal communicability, while the Antinomy explicitly raises the issue of grounding the conditions of arguing about and attempting to reach universal assent, and thus of grounding the conditions of the *actuality* of universal communicability. Second, I turn to the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ to demonstrate why this distinction is necessary insofar as judgments of taste are not based on concepts. Because the determining ground of such judgments is subjective, the claim that we can expect others to have judged as we do is problematized and the sense of beautiful objects is *underdetermined*. Rather, I argue that our expectation of others to judge as we have is a normative expectation, and the possibility, normativity, and conditions for actuality must be grounded in turn.

“Remarks on Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth,” Justin Remhof, University of Illinois

Nietzsche’s conception of truth has received a lot of attention in recent decades, but there is no consensus about his position. Commentators have attributed him with holding every common theory of truth, while some have maintained that he simply has no theory of truth. My aim is to present passages that suggest that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are best situated within either a coherence or pragmatist theory, rather than a correspondence framework. Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspondence theory because he thinks the truth-conditions of propositions are constitutively related to our interests and he rejects the principle of bivalence. I not only aim to call into question the interpretation that Nietzsche accepts the correspondence

theory, but also explore new ways in which his remarks can be read as supporting the coherence theory, and finally develop a novel approach for reading Nietzsche as a pragmatist about truth.

“*Sensus Communis* and Temporality in Kant’s *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*,” Kenneth Noe, University of Southern Illinois, Carbondale

This paper offers a critique of a recent reading of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment in which Melissa Zinkin argues that in judgments of taste the imagination is freed from its determinate relation with the understanding because the form of intuition in which beauty is apprehended is different from the form of intuition employed in determinate judgment. I rehearse Zinkin’s argument that in judgments of taste the imagination is not restricted to its determinate relation with the understanding because the form of intuition in which beauty is apprehended is not extensive but rather intensive in form. With Zinkin, I claim that by distinguishing between an extensive and intensive form of intuition, this interpretation is able to account for why the apprehension of beauty cannot be subsumed under a concept. However, I also argue that while this initial insight seems perfectly plausible—and is indeed successful in resolving some interpretive issues—I contest Zinkin’s further claim that it is the *sensus communis* itself that represents this intensive form of intuition. In contrast to Zinkin’s reading, I then attempt to substantiate two interrelated claims: First, that we can account for the genesis of the *sensus communis* by distinguishing between an intensive and an extensive form of time. Second, that we can avoid the potential pitfall of making the *sensus communis* into something atemporal by showing that it resides within an intensive form of time as a condition for its possibility, thereby structuring Kant’s account of the *sensus communis* securely within the critical framework.

“The Sincerity of Valuing: Honesty as a Nietzschean Value Standard,” Aaron Harper, West Liberty University

There is an obvious, or at least apparent, tension at the heart of Nietzsche’s metaethical position: he denies the traditional authority and objectivity of morality, but in doing so he seems to undermine his own standpoint for providing criticism and offering new values. I hold that Nietzsche offers his values as more than mere preferences, and in this paper I examine the kinds of value standards available to Nietzsche that we find present in his work. Rather than locating external value standards, I argue that Nietzsche offers internal standards of value, which I explicate by focusing on one particular value standard – honesty. Despite Nietzsche’s well-known criticisms of truth, he upholds honesty as the only remaining virtue of his free spirits. I defend honesty as a distinct kind of truthfulness, first evident in Nietzsche’s on tragedy, which reveals a certain kind of limitation on valuing.

“Skeptical Theism on Pain and Pleasure- A Response to Draper,” Jim Elliot, Purdue University

In a recent paper, Paul Draper (2013) argues that Bergmann’s (2001, 2008) version of skeptical theism fails to undermine “Hume-style” evidential arguments from evil, specifically his own 1989 argument. Draper addresses, correctly, how Bergmann’s skeptical-theist theses (“ST1-4”) successfully dispel Rowe-style “noseeum” evidential arguments from evil, yet fail to address his own 1989 argument. However, Draper’s formulation of “STe”—the thesis that Draper believes the “pure” skeptical theist needs to properly address his 1989 argument—includes a crucial flaw. Although Draper’s argument for the unreasonableness of STe is sound, its success is irrelevant, as STe is not the thesis the skeptical theist needs to defend. I will propose a new skeptical theist thesis—ST5—that (like STe) implies that Draper’s argument fails, but that (unlike STe) is plausible.

“The Soul as Two-Sided Illusion,” Courtney Morris, University of California, Riverside

Kant states that the soul is a “one-sided illusion,” meaning that we are only tempted to adopt one illusory view of it: that it is an immaterial, immortal substance (the “rationalist” view). In this paper I argue that although the soul is a one-sided illusion from the first-person perspective, it is a two-sided illusion from the perspective of what objects constitute the world. From the latter perspective, it looks to us as though the soul must be immaterial and immortal *and* as though it must be a material and mortal. There is an antinomy or contradiction

that lurks in our reasoning about the soul, which means that any empirical view of the soul that claims it is somehow reducible or identical to a material substance, is just as wrong as a rationalist view. Recognizing this allows us to see the relevance of Kant's theory to contemporary discussions of the soul (or what we might call the self or the mind) and illuminates Kant's puzzling talk of the "noumenal" self.

"Spinoza's Ethical Objectivism," Andrew Youpa, University of Southern Illinois, Carbondale

In this paper I show that Spinoza subscribes to ethical objectivism. By "ethical objectivism" I mean a theory of the kind of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which good and bad are objective properties. By "objective property" I mean a property whose instance(s) does (do) not directly depend on anyone's attitudes, emotions, or beliefs about its existence and nature. For example, in accordance with this definition, diabetic is an objective property because an instance of diabetes does not directly depend on anyone's attitudes, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of diabetes. My thesis is that, for Spinoza, the properties of goodness and badness are objective properties in the same sense that diabetic is an objective property. Instances of these properties do not directly depend on anyone's attitudes, emotions, and beliefs about their existence and nature.

"To Suspend Finitude Itself: Hegel's Early Reaction to Kant's First Antinomy," Reed Winegar, Fordham University

Recent commentators have interpreted Hegel as claiming that we should accept the conflicts of Kant's cosmological antinomies. Yet, Karl Ameriks has argued that this interpretation threatens Hegel's position with absurdity in the case of Kant's first antinomy, which concerns the age and size of the material world. This essay argues against Ameriks' objection by examining Hegel's early response to the time aspect of Kant's first antinomy in *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* and in *Faith and Knowledge*. In these works, Hegel neither accepts Kant's first antinomy nor claims that the world is both infinitely old and finitely old; instead, Hegel employs his conception of Reason to develop a metaphysical theory of eternity that avoids the arguments on which Kant's first antinomy is based.

"Truth We Can Aim At: Deflationism and Objective Norms of Assertion," Griffin Klemick, Northern Illinois University

Deflationists typically take the content of the truth property to be exhausted by instances of the schema the proposition that-p is true just in case p. But Crispin Wright has argued that this Equivalence Schema gives rise to an objective norm of assertion that deflationists lack resources to explain. In this paper, I examine Robert Brandom's attempt to meet Wright's challenge. I argue that Brandom's account of assertion's social function provides deflationists with the necessary materials. For, in asserting, speakers purport to authorize others to endorse their claims. Therefore, their claims may be in good or bad standing relative to the audience's evidence, and so are subject to norms that transcend the speakers' standpoints. Brandom's account, then, can ground a deflationist reduction of the truth norm to the norm Wright calls superassertibility. Perhaps deflationists will not wish to make this move; nevertheless, the strictures of deflationism do not prohibit it.

"Transmission Failure and Factive Warrants," Ian Schnee, Western Kentucky University

Transmission failure is standardly presented as a problem for non-factive warrants (it visually appears to me that the animal is a zebra), but Crispin Wright argues that it is a problem for factive warrants as well (I see that the animal is a zebra). I criticize Wright's arguments, but then present a new model of transmission failure for factive warrants that does not suffer from the problems that Wright's model does. I further argue that, although there are resources for replying to this transmission-failure challenge, most of them come at the cost of any theoretical advantage for factive warrants in explaining knowledge or answering skepticism. Thus it is very hard to get factive warrants to do the work one would want them to.