



Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall 2016 Meeting at DePauw University in Greencastle, IN 11-12 November 2016
Prindle Institute for Ethics

Meeting Program

Friday, 11 Nov	Session A Location	Session B Location
11-11:45	<i>Registration</i> (Location)	
11:45-12	<i>Welcome</i>	
	Business and Ethics Chair: Levi Tenen	Goods of all Sorts Chair: Rob Luzecky
12-12:55	“Business Ethics and the Integrity of Philosophy” Speaker: Daniel F. Hartner (Rose-Hulman Institute) Commenter: Josh Crabill (University of Indianapolis)	“Atrocious Harms and Transmuted Goods: A Love Story” Jill Hernandez (University of Texas at San Antonio) Nick Louzon (IUPUI)
1-1:55	“Leaders’ Moral Responsibility for Followers’ Acts: Trump and Abortion Clinic Bombings” Speaker: Eugene Schlossberger (Purdue Northwest) Commenter: Timothy Kirschenheiter (Wayne State)	“Immortality, Boredom, and the Beatific Vision” Rory Goggins (Murray State University) Calista Lam (Purdue University)
1:55-2:15	<i>Break with Refreshments</i>	
	Ethics and Animals Chair: David Fisher	Identity Chair: Rory Goggins
2:15-3:10	“The Real Reason Kant Provides the ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ for Valuing Animals” Speaker: Levi Tenen (Indiana University-Bloomington) Commenter: Brandon Rdzak (Purdue University)	“From Emergent Properties to Emergent Subject: A Neuroscientific Case” Eric LaRock (Oakland University) William Hasker (Huntington University)
3:15-4:10	“Nonhuman Animals Acting for Moral Reasons” Speaker: Asia Ferrin (Kansas State University) Commenter: Daniel F. Hartner (Rose-Hulman Institute)	“We Don’t Count by Functional Almost-Identity” Evan T. Woods (The Ohio State University) Matt Carlson (Wabash College)
4:15-5:10	“Feeling and Inclination: Rationalizing the Animal Within” Speaker: Janelle De Witt (Indiana University) Commenter: Asia Ferrin (Kansas State University)	“Me and My Avatar: Player-Character as Fictional Proxy” Matt Carlson and Logan Taylor (Wabash College) Jordan Neidlinger (Franklin College)
5:20-6:45	Keynote Address, Location “Hustle: Power and the Theory of Meaning” Jason Stanley Yale University	
7:00	Dinner (to be arranged informally after the sessions)	

Saturday, 12 Nov	Session A Location	Session B Location
8:15-9	<i>Registration (Location)</i>	
	Special Session: Ancient Philosophy Chair: Alida Liberman	Epistemology Chair: David Antonini
9-9:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Can a Jury Have Justified Beliefs about the Incidents of a Case?” Usha Nathan (Columbia University) Jack Himelright (University of Notre Dame)	“Indirect Instrumentalism about Epistemic Rationality” Corey Dethier (University of Notre Dame) Nevin Climenhaga (University of Notre Dame)
10-10:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Xenophanes’ Epistemology: Empiricist, Global Skeptic, or Both?” Timothy Kirschenheiter (Wayne State) Joshua Gulley (Purdue University)	“Belief, Credence, and Faith” Liz Jackson (University of Notre Dame) Hanna Sanko (Colorado State University)
11-11:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Systematic Ambiguity and Genuine Cosmology in Parmenides’ <i>Doxa</i> ” Joshua Gulley (Purdue University) Jeff Gower (Wabash College)	“‘Wisdom’ is Said in Many Ways” Daniel Simpson (Saint Louis University) Jonathan Maci (Ivy Tech-Indianapolis)
12-1:45	<i>Lunch and Business Meeting</i>	
1:45-2	<i>Student Awards Presentation</i>	
	Special Session: Social and Political Philosophy Chair: Usha Nathan	Language and Representation Chair: Hanna Sonko
2-2:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Disability, Sex Rights, and the Scope of Sexual Exclusion” Alida Liberman (University of Indianapolis) Jill Hernandez (University of Texas at San Antonio)	“Roman Ingarden’s Concept of Ideal Meaning” Rob Luzecky (IPFW) Evan T. Woods (The Ohio State University)
3-3:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Judgment Reconsidered” David Antonini (Southern Illinois U Carbondale) Peter Owens (Loyola Marymount University)	“A Conflict between van Inwagen’s Ontology and his Metaontology” David Fisher (Indiana University-Bloomington) Liz Jackson (University of Notre Dame)
4-4:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Statues or Bodies? Michel Serres and Human Rights Discourse” Peter Owens (Loyola Marymount University) John Ahrens (Hanover College)	“Why We Should Explain Exemplification Rather Than Representation (and How to Do So)” Jack Himelright (University of Notre Dame) David Coss (Purdue University)

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Abstracts of Presented Papers

Title: Hannah Arendt's Theory of Judgment Reconsidered

Author: David Antonini

Abstract: This paper considers the apparent gap that exists in Hannah Arendt's thoughts on judgment between the judgment of a spectator and the judgment of an actor. I aim to show such a gap does not exist in her thought and that, instead, Arendt shifts the emphasis of her account of judgment from considering judgment as opinion formation to judgments of exemplary validity. Such a shift in emphasis within her thought does not imply the gap that others have frequently attributed to her. Drawing on recent scholarship, I aim to preliminarily sketch why such a gap is not present.

Title: Me and My Avatar: Player-Character as Fictional Proxy

Author: Matt Carlson and Logan Taylor

Abstract: Players of videogames describe their gameplay in the first person, e.g. "I shot a splicer with a shotgun." Such descriptions are natural because videogames are interactive fictions. But this is puzzling since the player is actually pushing a button, not shooting anything. According to a popular view, which we call the fictional identity view, the puzzle is solved by claiming that the player-character is the player's identity in the game's fiction. On this view, it is correct to say that I fired a shotgun in BioShock because Jack fired a shotgun and Jack fictionally is me. However, the identity view does not make sense of players' gameplay experiences and descriptions of them. We develop an alternative account on which the player-character serves as the player's fictional proxy, and argue that this account of the relationship between the player and player-character makes better sense of our experiences playing videogames.

Title: Feeling and Inclination: Rationalizing the Animal Within

Author: Janelle De Witt

Abstract: A common assumption among Kantians is that the feelings/inclinations constituting non-moral motivation are little different from the brute sensations and blind instinctual urges found in animals. And since this "inner animal" lacks reason, it cannot control itself, so our rational nature must step in to govern. The problem, however, is that it must do so as a nature standing above the animal as an independent ruler. I reject this understanding of our lower nature, arguing instead that reason governs from within our feelings/inclinations, by giving them shape and structure. This is possible because Kant actually held a *cognitive* theory, one in which feeling takes the form of judgments of fit between an object and the sensible needs of the subject, by which the life or well-being of the subject is promoted. Through these judgments of feeling, reason generates a complex evaluative framework that structures our practical point of view.

Title: Indirect Instrumentalism about Epistemic Rationality

Author: Corey Dethier

Abstract: Traditionally, instrumentalism about epistemic rationality has been 'direct' in that it identifies epistemic rationality with a subset of instrumental rationality. Recent work on epistemic rationality suggests the possibility of an 'indirect' version of the instrumentalist position. Rather than identifying epistemic rationality with instrumental rationality, the indirect instrumentalist position holds that the normative force of epistemic rules derives from our instrumental reasons to follow those rules. In this paper, I examine three objections raised against the traditional version of instrumentalism to flesh out the indirect version and argue that all of the typical arguments lack force against indirect instrumentalism.

Title: Nonhuman Animals Acting for Moral Reasons

Author: Asia Ferrin

Abstract: Imagine that Sarah and Jill are at the park. A loud noise startles Sarah. Jill is not startled by the noise, but notices that Sarah is upset and moves toward Sarah to comfort her, putting her arm around Sarah. Is Jill morally responsible for this action? On the face of it, yes. But what if Jill is an elephant? Does our evaluation change? In this paper, I argue that our moral evaluations should not change—instead, we should accept that some animals' actions are normatively evaluable. In Section I, I explain what it means to act morally. In Section II, I review empirical research on the capacities needed for moral action in humans and show that animals also have such capacities. I conclude that though we cannot engage in the practice of holding animals morally responsible, some animals nevertheless act morally in ways for which they are, in theory, responsible.

Title: A Conflict between van Inwagen's Ontology and his Metaontology

Author: David Fisher

Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has in recent decades made significant and influential contributions to metaphysics. In *Material Beings* he advanced a novel ontology according to which chairs and other medium-sized dry goods don't really exist. He then went on to make has also made contributions to metaontology. Parts of his *Ontology, Identity, and Modality and Existence: Essays in Ontology* defend a broadly Quinean conception of existence questions and how to address them. I argue that the metaontology articulated in those later works is in fact inconsistent with the ontology of earlier work. I suggest that the explanation of how such an inconsistency could arise in the views of a very careful philosopher is that in elaborating his later metaontology he failed to appreciate just how Quinean of a perspective he was operating from in defending his earlier work in ontology.

Title: Immortality, Boredom, and the Beatific Vision

Author: Rory Goggins

Abstract: I argue, *contra* Bernard Williams, that personal immortality is not necessarily unattractive. I base this conclusion on an assessment of Aquinas's conception of beatitude. Aquinas conceives of beatitude, commonly referred to as the beatific vision, as a state of unity that one may have with God after death. I argue that the beatific vision is possible, and that it satisfies both of the conditions that Williams sets on the desirability of immortality. Since Aquinas's conception of beatitude includes the notion of eternity, his viewpoint represents an important alternative to the viewpoints of contemporary defenders of the desirability of immortality.

Title: Systematic Ambiguity and Genuine Cosmology in Parmenides' *Doxa*

Author: Joshua Gulley

Abstract: Parmenides made significant contributions to Greek astronomy and developed a new paradigm for scientific explanation in the final part of his poem, the *Doxa*; however, the *Doxa* is a 'deceptive order of words' (fragment B8.52). Although the *Doxa* is somehow 'likely' (B8.60), its avowed deception stands in contrast to its scientific contributions. I argue that Parmenides composed the *Doxa* so that reading it in light of the metaphysics of the *Alētheia* would provide an acceptable cosmology; however, he arranged its words ambiguously to invite absurd readings, which expose the emptiness of cosmology without the *Alētheia*. This interpretation makes the best sense overall of (1) the genuine science in the *Doxa*, (2) how Parmenides' successors treat the relationship between the *Doxa*'s scientific paradigm and the *Alētheia*'s metaphysics, and (3) Parmenides' ability to see what his successors saw: how the *Doxa*'s paradigm can work with the *Alētheia*.

Title: Why We Should Explain Exemplification Rather than Representation (and How to Do So)

Author: Jack Himelright

Abstract: Recently, Jeffrey King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks have contended that the fact that propositions are representational must be explained: it would be too mysterious and strange for propositions to be primitively representational. These philosophers have made free use of properties and relations in their explanations of how propositions are representational, implicitly taking it to be brute that properties and relations are exemplifiable. I argue there is a good reason to prefer explaining the fact that properties and relations are exemplifiable by exploiting primitively representational propositions: if we do so and assume that some spatiotemporal things non-derivatively represent things (perhaps agents), we can explain how we have the concepts of representation and exemplification, whereas taking properties and relations to be primitively exemplifiable makes it inexplicable how we come to have the latter concept. I then show how this explanation goes, identifying properties and relations with certain propositions and analyzing exemplification.

Title: Business Ethics and the Integrity of Philosophy

Author: Daniel F. Hartner

Abstract: Two widely accepted ideas in business ethics—now also regularly taught as indisputable common sense in classrooms and textbooks on the subject—are philosophically problematic at best and morally disingenuous and irresponsible at worst: the self-assured rejection of moral universalism in favor of so-called moral contextualism (or pluralism) in international business, and the endorsement of context-blind moral satisficing, i.e., the idea that a desirable outcome of training in business ethics is an ability of the student or businessperson to innovate a passable ethical solution under any circumstances whatever. My purpose in this paper is to urge rejection of both of these now stock positions as products of the same dangerous tendency: an insidiously probusiness and anti-philosophical neglect of the moral status of the context in which a putatively ethical decision is situated. Insofar as business ethics remains under the auspices of ethics and philosophy, it is the proper role of business ethics courses to encourage constant vigilance of the context in which business is conducted, not to encourage finding creative ways to apply an ethical stamp of approval to today's corporate status quo.

Title: Atrocious Harms and Transmuted Goods: A Love Story

Author: Jill Hernandez

Abstract: The atrocity paradigm remains an effective ethical framework from which to eradicate horrendous evil. But, the moral goals of the paradigm are threatened by *transmuted goods*, which share the characteristics of atrocity, but positively alter those who have suffered atrocity. The upshot is that the atrocity paradigm either must abandon the transmutativity aspect of an atrocity or discover a way to incorporate transmuted goods as a positive theory within the paradigm. I argue that the paradigm can neither consistently abandon the transmutativity of atrocity nor seamlessly integrate transmuted goods into the paradigm. But, the paper concludes by reimagining a moral system in which transmuted goods (grounded by love) can alter the trajectory of the impact of atrocious harms in communities, and so also, the response of the paradigm to positive goods.

Title: Belief, Credence, and Faith

Author: Liz Jackson

Abstract: Can faith go beyond the evidence yet still be rational? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I give a number of cases where faith that p is insensitive to certain kinds of evidence that bears on whether p . Then, I offer a distinction between two kinds of evidence: probabilistic evidence and “flat out” evidence. I argue that this distinction makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief; rational belief is more sensitive to flat-out evidence than the probabilistic evidence. Then, I argue that rational faith, like rational belief, is more sensitive to flat-out evidence than to probabilistic evidence. I explain how these two theses can explain why faith is rational yet sometimes insensitive to evidence. I explore some upshots of my view, and then respond to objections.

Title: Xenophanes' Epistemology: Empiricist, Global Skeptic, or Both?

Author: Timothy Kirschenheiter

Abstract: In this paper, I consider two interpretations of Xenophanes' epistemology. First, I consider an interpretation that claims that Xenophanes is an empiricist. I construe the term 'empiricist' broadly as referring to anyone who asserts that the proper way to investigate the world is through an analysis of experience. Next, I consider an interpretation that claims that Xenophanes is a global skeptic. By 'global skeptic' I mean one who rejects the possibility of any knowledge. While considering these two interpretations, I give the implicit reasons why those who give each interpretation seem to believe that Xenophanes' being an empiricist precludes his being a skeptic and vice versa. Finally, I argue that these two positions are actually consistent and that the proper interpretation of Xenophanes' epistemology is that he is both an empiricist and a global skeptic.

Title: From Emergent Properties to Emergent Subject: A Neuroscientific Case

Author: Eric LaRock

Abstract: There are over thirty distinct processing sites within and across the visual cortical hierarchy alone. Moreover, Zeki and colleagues recently discovered an asynchronous relation between processing sites, the temporal gaps of which can be as great as 80 milliseconds. Thus, not only are the processing sites that encode the contents of an object distributed in space, they are distributed in time, too. As a consequence of mulling over the distributed nature of information encodings, Wolf Singer proposes that a unified object of visual experience is most likely an emergent property of a specific dynamical state of the cortical neural network. I argue that while Singer's proposal has some merit, it nonetheless falls short when it comes to certain explanatory targets, such as the unity of conscious experience *across* cortices of the brain. Finally, I propose a new hypothesis and consider objections.

Title: Disability, Sex Rights, and the Scope of Sexual Exclusion

Author: Alida Liberman

Abstract: Jacob M. Appel argues that disabled individuals have a right to sex, and should receive a special exemption to the general prohibition of prostitution. Frej Klem Thomsen argues *contra* Appel that an appeal to sex rights cannot justify such an exception. I argue that Appel fails, but not (solely) on the grounds Thomsen proposes. I lay out Appel's argument and outline three worries that Thomsen raises against Appel. I argue that the most serious worry—that charge that Appel is unclear about the scope of sexual exclusion—points to a major flaw in the way that both Appel and Thomsen frame their positive accounts: they focus on disability status as a proxy for sexual exclusion, when they should be focusing on sexual exclusion directly. Finally, I argue that Thomsen has missed what I take to be the most pressing objection to Appel's argument: his second premise states, "We have (decisive) reason not to violate rights." This is either false, or establishes only a very weak conclusion.

Title: Roman Ingarden's Concept of Ideal Meaning

Authors: Rob Luzecky

Abstract: One of the most vexing conclusions of Roman Ingarden's ontology of literary works of art is that the words in a literary text are "supratemporal" entities that exist outside the temporal continuum. This becomes much less obscure when we examine Ingarden's extensive elaboration of the nature of supratemporal entities. In this paper, I elucidate the claim that an element of the meaning of words is not extended over any period of the history of the real world. That is, I justify Ingarden's claim that the meaning elements of words are not entirely reducible to social conventions.

Title: Can a Jury Have Justified Beliefs about the Incidents of a Case?

Author: Usha Nathan

Abstract: In this paper, I consider what justifies the beliefs of a jury that concern particular aspects of a case that necessarily involve perception. I develop an account of the process that the jury might undergo in reaching a justified belief on the basis of Aristotle's discussion of deliberation about the future in the *de Anima*. I propose that the juror *sees* the situational features through her imagination (*phantasia*). Specifically, she forms an image of the relevant action and its context in the course of reasoning about the case. And I suggest that such a use of the imagination is reliable in so far as it is informed by one's experiential knowledge of the kind that is relevant to the case. Such knowledge consists of dispositional abilities of perception and action learnt over time and in the course of living one's life in a community.

Title: Statues or Bodies? Michel Serres and Human Rights Discourse

Author: Peter Owens

Abstract: The problem of how wealthy democratic nations can best aid developing nations to succeed in a global economy while also encouraging them to establish robust democratic institutions has been a challenge for most of the last century. The fact that the "most free" nations on the planet still wrestle with economic aid, free trade, torture, mass incarceration, and terrorism is a strong indication that the halcyon days of human rights discourse are ahead of us. I will provide a brief explication of Michel Serres's concepts of hard and soft reality and explain how bodies that demonstrate a mingling of these realities are more likely to survive the crises they encounter. Then I will identify some problems that Serres might identify with what Eric Posner calls "human rights discourse" and conclude with some suggestions of ways that Serres and Posner agree with regard to bolstering the shortcomings of human rights discourse.

Title: Leaders' Moral Responsibility for Followers' Acts: Trump and Abortion Clinic Bombings

Author: Eugene Schlossberger

Abstract: Do Donald Trump's statements about punching make him morally responsible for violence at his rallies? Are anti-abortionists responsible for bombings of abortion clinics? Traditional theories of moral responsibility must answer "no." This paper employs the first fully developed attributionist theory of moral responsibility (that we are responsible for instantiating features that reveal our worldviews—our values, attitudes, etc.) to articulate three tests for leaders' responsibility for followers' acts: The imprimatur test (leaders are responsible for approving of a follower's act in one of three ways), the foreseeability test (leaders who can reasonably foresee that their act is likely to result in acts of that kind are responsible for deciding that their act is justifiable despite the risk), and the modeling test (leaders are responsible when, under certain conditions, they model the relevant behavior).

Title: 'Wisdom' is Said in Many Ways

Author: Daniel Simpson

Abstract: Recent work in epistemology has shown a renewed interest in the nature and value of wisdom. The current literature on wisdom, however, is in need of serious disambiguation concerning the term 'wisdom'. In this paper, I identify four different uses of the term 'wisdom' in the literature: (1) 'Wisdom' as a term used in ordinary English discourse; (2) 'Wisdom' as a term used to pick out an epistemic good Aristotle called 'sophia' that is distinct from another epistemic good called 'phronesis'; (3) 'Wisdom' as a term used to pick out the genus that contains the species sophia and phronesis; (4) 'Wisdom' as a term used as a generic placeholder for the supreme epistemic good of human beings—whatever that good actually is. I will show how these ambiguities cause confusion in the literature, and I will draw out two important but unresolved issues concerning methodology and wisdom's value.

Title: The Real Reason Kant Provides the "Wrong Kind of Reason" for Valuing Animals

Author: Levi Tenen

Abstract: Kant holds that we should feel gratitude towards non-rational animals who have worked for us because, if we don't, we "gradually uproot a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other men." Although Kant justifies feeling the right attitude towards service animals, many commentators think he does so using the wrong kind of reason. I investigate why Kant's justification is of the wrong sort. Some people worry that Kant's justification rests on a fragile connection between animals and our predispositions. Others worry that Kant's justification is not about the animals. I argue that neither account of the "wrong reason objection" facing Kant are successful. I end by drawing from a discussion in metaethics and epistemology on "wrong reasons" to suggest that Kant's justification is of the wrong kind because it cannot lead us, via reason-guided processes, to feel gratitude towards animals.

Title: We Don't Count by Fictional Almost-Identity

Author: Evan T. Woods

Abstract: In this paper I argue against C.S. Sutton's (2015) solution to the problem of the many. Sutton argues that we count by functional almost-identity. Roughly, this means that we count as one things that significantly overlap in their functions, where this sharing of functions is the result of extensive mereological overlap. I present cases in which there is extensive mereological overlap that gives rise to extensive functional overlap and functional almost-identity, but we would not count the functionally overlapping things as one. Hence, we don't count by functional almost-identity.