



Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall 2018 Meeting at Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 16-17 November 2018

Friday, 16 Nov	Session A Hoosier Room	Session B Redbud Room
9:00-9:30	<i>Registration</i> (in Hoosier Room), coffee and snacks available	
	Special Session: Existentialism Chair: Charlene Elsby (Purdue University Fort Wayne)	Philosophy of Science and Ethics Chair: Domenic D'Ettore (Marian University)
9:30-10:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Overcoming Subjects-as-Substrata James Mollison (Purdue) Leigh Viner (Indiana University Southeast)	The Rate of Time's Passage and Special Relativity Seungil Lee (Univ. Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Jacob Archambault (Independent Scholar)
10:30-11:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Sartre on Subjectivity and Non-Knowledge: A Bridge between Existentialism and Marxism Curtis Sommerlatte (Union College) Autumn Averitt (Indiana University)	Methodological Synthesis in the Paterson-Clarke Technique Meghan Page (Loyola University Maryland) Monica Morrison (Indiana University)
11:30-12:25 Speaker: Commenter:	Ecstasy and Time's Necessary Companion: A Refutation of Heidegger's Temporocentrism R. Maxwell Spears (Purdue) Allen Wood (Indiana University)	Vindicating Hampton's Expressive Retributivism as a Theory of Rebuke Jason Lee Byas (Univ. Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Strand Sheldahl-Thomason (Purdue Fort Wayne)
12:25-1:30	<i>Lunch</i>	
	Political Philosophy Chair: Ivan Verano (Indiana University)	Epistemology Chair: Bernd Buldt (Purdue University Fort Wayne)
1:30-2:25 Speaker: Commenter:	"Living quietly makes not a Man Member of the Society": Tacit Consent and the Ends of Locke's Political Society Alzbeta Hajkova (Purdue) Michael Botta (IUPUI)	Normativity & Non-Conceptual Content Micah Dubreuil (San Francisco State University) Dylan Black (Indiana University)
2:30-3:25 Speaker: Commenter:	The Role of Individualist Values in Morality K.M. Stroh (Indiana University) David Denz (Marian University)	Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences Galen Barry (Iona College) Nicole Dular (Franklin College)
3:30-5:30	<p style="text-align: center;">Keynote Address, Hoosier Room</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Glad It Happened: The Self in Time and the Depth of a Human Life</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Marya Schechtman</p> <p style="text-align: center;">University of Illinois at Chicago</p>	
5:30	Dinner (to be arranged informally after the sessions)	

Saturday, 17 Nov	Session A Dogwood Room	Session B Oak Room
8:30-9	<i>Registration</i> (in Dogwood Room), coffee and snacks available	
	Ethics and Philosophy of Mind Chair: David Denz (Marian University)	Idealist Metaphysics Chair: Galen Barry (Iona College)
9-9:55	The Care of the Self as Exposure: Revisiting Michel Foucault's Ethics Speaker: Strand Sheldahl-Thomason (Purdue University Fort Wayne) Commenter: Jeff Gower (Wabash)	Metaphysical Considerations in Descartes' <i>Regulae</i> Steven Burgess (Benedictine University) Jim Hutchinson (Indiana University)
10-10:55	Normative Bedrock & Non-Normative Content Speaker: Kevin Mills (Indiana University) Commenter: James Andrew Smith, Jr. (Indiana University)	A Defense of the Conceptual Approach to Transcendental Idealism Against Paul Guyer Alexander Buchinski (Indiana University) Kevin Harrelson (Ball State University)
11-11:55	The Functional Structure of Consciousness Speaker: Dylan Black (Indiana University) Commenter: Zara Anwarzai (Indiana University)	Schopenhauer's Causal Account of <i>Acting for a Reason</i> Sean T. Murphy (Indiana University) R. Maxwell Spears (Purdue)
11:55-12:45	<i>Lunch</i>	
12:45	<i>Student Awards Presentation</i> (Dogwood Room) Recipient: James Mollison	
	Special Session: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Chair: Domenic D'Ettore (Marian University)	Logic and Metaphysics Chair: Daniel Lindquist (Indiana University)
1-1:55	Epicurus on the Goodness of Knowledge Speaker: Alex R Gillham (Indiana University Kokomo) Commenter: Jonathan Nebel (St. Louis University)	Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic Ethan Brauer (Ohio State) David Fisher (Indiana University)
2-2:55	Scotist Hylomorphism in Support of the Total Brain Death Criterion Speaker: Tyler Wittenmyer (Franciscan University of Steubenville) Commenter: Jason Eberl (St. Louis University)	Charity and Explaining My Logical Truths: Problems for Jared Warren's Conventionalism James Andrew Smith, Jr. (Indiana University) Kaley J. Rittichier (Ball State University)
3-3:55	The semantic account of formal consequence, from Alfred Tarski back to John Buridan Speaker: Jacob Archambault (Independent Scholar) Commenter: Matt Carlson (Wabash College)	Why Can't Truth Be Valuable? Jim Hutchinson (Indiana University) Ethan Brauer (Ohio State)
4:00-5:00	<i>Executive Meeting</i> (Dogwood Room)	

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Abstracts of Presented Papers

Title: The semantic account of formal consequence, from Alfred Tarski back to John Buridan

Author: Jacob Archambault

Abstract: The resemblance of the theory of formal consequence first offered by the 14th-century logician John Buridan to that later offered by Alfred Tarski has long been remarked upon. But it has not yet been subjected to sustained analysis. In this paper, I provide just such an analysis. I begin by reviewing today's classical understanding of formal consequence, then highlighting its differences from Tarski's 1936 account. Following this, I introduce Buridan's account, detailing its philosophical underpinnings, then its content. This then allows us to separate those aspects of Tarski's account representing genuine historical advances, unavailable to Buridan, from others merely differing from - and occasionally explicitly rejected by - Buridan's account.

Title: Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences

Author: Galen Barry

Abstract: There's much recent discussion about whether moral considerations ever raise the justificatory bar for a belief. But all involved seem to agree that moral considerations don't affect a person's *confidence* in a proposition. This paper argues for a radical thesis: there's at least one situation in which specifically moral considerations require that a person lower her *confidence* in a proposition. I argue part of what makes a person deserving of respect is her capacity to surprise others, including the capacity to surprise others with her epistemic qualities. So, the act of morally respectful listening requires an openness to this capacity. I then argue that complete confidence in a proposition is incompatible with such openness. It follows that complete confidence is incompatible with listening respectfully to a person whom one disagrees with. One therefore has *moral* reason to lower one's confidence. I end by highlighting two potential applications of my thesis.

Title: The Functional Structure of Consciousness

Author: Dylan Black

Abstract: I argue that evolutionary science may provide an independent standard of evidence for evaluating among candidate theories of consciousness. I begin by distinguishing between two kinds of functions that scientists might attribute to consciousness: etiological functions and Cummins functions. While scientists are ultimately hoping to arrive at an analysis of consciousness in terms of its Cummins functions, I argue that they must first discover the etiological functions of consciousness. I then propose that scientists can use evolutionary biology in order to attribute etiological functions to consciousness, but that they must do so on the basis of evidence that is neutral with respect to the major theories of consciousness.

Title: Metaphysical Nihilism and Modal Logic

Author: Ethan Brauer

Abstract: In this paper I argue, that if it is metaphysically possible for it to have been the case that nothing existed, then it follows that the right modal logic cannot extend **D**, ruling out popular modal logics **S4** and **S5**. I provisionally defend the claim that it is possible for nothing to have existed. I then consider the various ways of resisting the conclusion that the right modal logic is weaker than **D**. The strongest objection to this conclusion is that states of affairs exist necessarily, so it is not possible for there to have been nothing. I do not pretend to settle the questions of whether

states of affairs exist necessarily or whether it is genuinely possible for there to have been nothing. But we are left with the methodological conclusion that the choice of modal logic is entangled with metaphysical questions about the possibility of nihilism and the necessary existence of abstracta.

Title: A Defense of the Conceptual Approach to Transcendental Idealism Against Paul Guyer

Author: Alexander Buchinski

Abstract: In this paper I present Paul Guyer's argument in "Transcendental Idealism: What and Why?" for the claim that one must take an ontological approach to interpreting transcendental idealism. I argue that Guyer's main argument rests on a misinterpretation of Kant's argument that space and time must be forms of our intuition that do not apply to things in themselves. I first present Guyer's distinction between an ontological and conceptual approach to transcendental idealism, and his argument for why one must take an ontological approach. I then argue that Guyer misconstrues Kant's argument that space and time must be forms of our intuition. On a correct interpretation of this argument, it serves to undermine Guyer's claim that we must take an ontological approach to interpreting transcendental idealism.

Title: Metaphysical Considerations in Descartes' *Regulae*

Author: Steven Burgess

Abstract: The early unfinished work, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, has regularly been considered to be Descartes' most important methodological text. This is for good reason, as nowhere else does he offer such extended commentary on method, and that includes his much more widely studied *Discourse on Method*. This has caused some to consider the *Regulae* to be entirely devoid of the kind of metaphysical content found in later works. Despite both the fact that the work is devoted to themes we would now call "epistemological" and that Descartes rarely even mentions the traditional topics of metaphysics, I maintain that he nevertheless carries out some necessary metaphysical investigation. I aim to demonstrate that there are aspects of Descartes' view of the simple natures, especially as discussed in Rule XII, that qualify as metaphysical in addition to the oft-discussed epistemological considerations.

Title: Vindicating Hampton's Expressive Retributivism as a Theory of Rebuke

Author: Jason Lee Byas

Abstract: I argue that Jean Hampton's version of expressive retributivism provides an attractive account of interpersonal rebuke, irrespective of its benefits and hazards as a theory of criminal punishment. This is because it uniquely accounts for the fact that the fact that there is something about rebuking wrongdoers that is of special importance for those they have wronged. In defending her view, I elaborate on Hampton's notion of a person's "acknowledgement" by conceiving of it as an ongoing social phenomenon, rather than an isolated act of recognition or non-recognition. This framing of acknowledgement makes clear the moral place of rebuke.

Title: Normativity & Non-Conceptual Content

Author: Micah Dubreuil

Abstract: In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Wilfrid Sellars argues that ostensible perceptions (veridical sightings and non-veridical lookings) share not only a common propositional content but also a common descriptive content. There has since been significant disagreement over whether this content is conceptual or non-conceptual. Here I endorse a version of Jay Rosenberg's non-conceptualist account, emphasizing the Heideggerian turn in *The Thinking Self*. I follow Joseph Rouse's criticism of Hubert Dreyfus, wherein he distinguishes descriptive from normative accounts of conceptualism. However, I utilize the structure of this argument to explain and preserve the role of (normatively structured) non-conceptual content.

Title: Epicurus on the Goodness of Knowledge

Author: Alex R Gillham

Abstract: Almost all scholars working on Epicurus take him to claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and that something other than pleasure is only incidentally good insofar as it promotes our pleasure or constitutes pleasure for

us. For the purposes of this paper, I call this the standard reading of Epicurus on the value of pleasure (EP). If EP is true, Epicurus thinks that only pleasure is intrinsically good, although other things can be good instrumentally or constitutively. I have two aims here. First, I argue that there is insufficient evidence for attributing EP to Epicurus. Second, I argue that Epicurus rejects EP. Epicurus claims that learning and doing philosophy for the sake of knowledge are always good, even when they do not promote or constitute pleasure, which could not be true if Epicurus were to endorse EP itself.

Title: "Living quietly makes not a Man Member of the Society:" Tacit Consent and the Ends of Locke's Political Society

Author: Alzbeta Hajkova

Abstract: Locke distinguishes between two different outcomes that express and tacit consent have regarding the commonwealth: The former is quite rare, and it gives rise to an irreversible membership in the commonwealth, while the latter results in a temporary subjection to its laws and enjoyment of protection within it. A. John Simmons attempts to save Locke from the commonwealth where only a few people have a permanent membership gained through express consent through developing an understanding of tacit consent that results in a full, irrevocable membership. Contrary to this, I argue that Locke's tacit consent cannot provide a full membership status in the commonwealth. I further argue that the crucial instrument for the preservation of the ends of political life in Locke's commonwealth is not going to be one's permanent membership in it, but rather one's subjection to its rules and laws, meaning this instrument will belong to both members and non-members of the commonwealth equally. Consequently, we do not have to worry about the ends of Locke's commonwealth being threatened even if the political society is indeed going to be composed dominantly out of those who joined it by tacit consent.

Title: Why Can't Truth Be Valuable?

Author: Jim Hutchinson

Abstract: Recent discussions of the value of truth typically assume that what is true---the propositions or facts---is not valuable. They assume that what is valuable is, rather, our relations to what is true, such as believing and knowing. What justifies this assumption? I discuss two reasons that epistemologists have for denying that the truths themselves are valuable, based respectively on the fact that some truths are evil, and some truths are trivial. I argue, however, that neither reason ultimately motivates that denial. In fact, a proper understanding of the role of trivial truths in our cognitive ideal provides us with positive reason to suppose that the value of truth is always in the truths themselves, and only sometimes in our relations to them.

Title: The Rate of Time's Passage and Special Relativity

Author: Seungil Lee

Abstract: There is an interesting skeptical question about passivism, or the view that time passes: "if time passes, what is a rate of time's passage?" The only answer to this question so far proposed is that time passes at the rate of 1 second per second. It has been objected, however, that this is not acceptable as a rate, partly because it could not have other values. In the first half of this paper, I argue that this is in fact a serious objection to passivism. In the second half of the paper, I argue that passivism is consistent with special relativity, and if understood in the context of special relativity, passivism allows a natural notion of rates of time's passage that avoid this objection.

Title: Normative Bedrock & Non-Normative Content

Author: Kevin Mills

Abstract: Some recent metaethical positions – most notably, Scanlon (2014) – try to effect a strict separation between normative and non-normative content. On these views, fundamental normative truths are completely independent of non-normative truths, i.e. are, in Scanlon's terminology "purely normative". My paper attacks this idea, and argues that normative and non-normative content cannot be separated in this way. My argument builds on some work from Gideon Rosen (2014, 2017). Rosen argues that non-naturalists like Scanlon may be unable to account for the metaphysical necessity of moral truths, insofar as it's not clear what an account of this phenomenon would look like. I argue that the situation is worse than this; if we accept Scanlon's account of pure normativity, an account of the metaphysical necessity

of moral truths is impossible. I argue that the lesson of all this is that normative and non-normative content cannot be separated in the way Scanlon envisions.

Title: Rethinking Nietzsche's Übermensch: Overcoming Subjects-as-Substrata

Author: James Mollison

Abstract: This paper re-examines the long-standing problem of how to understand Nietzsche's übermensch. It has three sections. In section one, I review the predominant interpretations of the übermensch and their associated difficulties. In section two, I discuss slave morality's conception of the subject-as-substratum and Nietzsche's objections against it. I then argue that interpretations of the übermensch should avoid this account of agency because, for Nietzsche, it defines humanity. Unfortunately, extant readings neglect this interpretive constraint. My final section proposes an alternative reading in which the übermensch is defined by a particular activity of overcoming, viz. a wholehearted risk of oneself in pursuit of greater power. In requiring an identification of agent and action, such self-overcoming elides slave morality's notion of the subject-as-substratum. This reading also avoids the difficulties faced by the interpretations currently on offer. On these grounds, I conclude that it merits consideration.

Title: Schopenhauer's Causal Account of *Acting for a Reason*

Author: Sean T. Murphy

Abstract: Schopenhauer claims that human actions are causally necessitated by their grounds. Although it may seem to us from the point of view of self-conscious reflection that we are free to will what we will, and so free to act how we act, this is an illusion (cf. *WWR* 312-19; *FW* 34, 42-47, 54-58). However, for many philosophers who draw inspiration from Kant, this causal-deterministic account of the nature of motivation and the will is horribly flawed, since it cannot make sense of the phenomenon of *acting for a reason*. To act for a reason, says the Kantian, we must be free. In this paper I show that, for Schopenhauer, this is not the case. Actions performed for reasons are causally determined by their grounds, i.e. by their sufficient reason. Human beings can and do act for reasons, but that capacity does not entail that they are free in doing so.

Title: Methodological Synthesis in the Paterson-Clarke Technique

Author: Meghan Page

Abstract: Carol Cleland draws a distinction between "prototypical natural historical science" and "classical experimental science." The former, she claims, offers narratives and explanations of particular historical events, while the latter seeks to establish law-like regularities. Cleland further argues this methodological difference is grounded in "the asymmetry of over-determination." I argue that scientific practice suggests a mutual dependence between these two approaches in some instances of scientific inquiry. To illustrate this methodological convergence, I offer a case-study of the Paterson-Clarke technique, an important breakthrough in glaciology which resulted in the construction of reliable historical temperature records that provide some of the best evidence for global warming. Finally, I discuss how this sort of scientific procedure is problematic for Cleland's picture of historical science.

Title: The Care of the Self as Exposure: Revisiting Michel Foucault's Ethics

Author: Strand Sheldahl-Thomason

Abstract: I argue that the defining feature of the care of the self as Foucault understands it is a practice of exposure or opening of a constituted self in order to bring about a modicum of reconstitution. That is, the care of the self, if we are to take it seriously as a contemporary ethical program, should be understood as submitting the self, which has been shaped by various forces, to other forces that can shape the self differently. Reading the care of the self as exposure, as I do here, connects Foucault's ethical project to his earlier archaeological and genealogical works because it frames his ethics as offering a practical response to the problem of our constitution that he so eloquently raises in his earlier works.

Title: Charity and Explaining My Logical Truths: Problems for Jared Warren's Conventionalism

Author: James Andrew Smith, Jr.

Abstract: In "Change of Logic, Change of Meaning," Jared Warren argues that a principle of charitable translation supports the view that changing a logic entails changing the meaning of a logical connective. I argue that Warren's views

on charitable translation are mistaken. I then argue that his mistake not only shows that his view lacks a normative implication he claims it does, but that it also raises doubts about Warren's case elsewhere in his work for logical conventionalism – the view that the rules governing the use of logical connectives fully explain the truth of logically true sentences in our language.

Title: Sartre on Subjectivity and Non-Knowledge: A Bridge between Existentialism and Marxism

Author: Curtis Sommerlatte

Abstract: In the recently published English translation of Sartre's 1961 Rome Lecture, "Marxism and Subjectivity", Sartre deploys the peculiar notion of "non-knowledge". This notion has received scant attention, which is surprising for two reasons. First, Sartre suggestively uses the notion in other readily available texts, including *Search for a Method* and the multiple volumes of his Flaubert biography. Second, the notion of non-knowledge offers a potential bridge between Sartre's existentialism and his later Marxist thought. I shall argue that "non-knowledge" refers to a lack of complete self-knowledge, and Sartre holds that such non-knowledge is constitutive for human subjectivity because it is a necessary condition for freedom. This is not apparent from Sartre's text, since (unlike his earlier works) this lecture does not mention freedom at all. Hence, my interpretation shows that and how Sartre's later Marxist philosophy is still rooted on his earlier existentialist commitment to human beings' freedom.

Title: Ecstasy and Time's Necessary Companion: A Refutation of Heidegger's Temporocentrism

Author: R. Maxwell Spears

Abstract: This paper argues that Heidegger's account of temporality is impossible without a spatial supplement. In *Being and Time* Heidegger argues that temporality is 1) the foundation of human existence, and 2) a differentiated unity composed of the *ecstases* of past (having-been), present (making-present) and future (projection). These ecstases must be thought together, but they stand out from each other as different structural moments. I argue that the temporal ecstases cannot be properly differentiated as long as temporality is the *sole* ground of human existence. To mount this argument against Heidegger I turn to Kant's "Refutation of Idealism," which argues that time-determinations, or the differentiation of time into past, present, and future, are impossible without a spatial relatedness to objects. I provide a reading of Kant's argument that can be applied to Heidegger's temporality, thus showing that temporality remains undifferentiated without a foundational relatedness *qua* existential spatiality.

Title: The Role of Individualist Values in Morality

Author: K.M. Stroh

Abstract: In this paper, I examine Charles Taylor's critique of contemporary individualistic values – such as individual freedom – in order to provide a framework for understanding the interrelation of social and individualistic values that Taylor's analysis reveals. Additionally, I will argue that this interrelation is one of a part (individualistic concerns) to a whole (moral value) and demonstrate how the elevation of these individualistic concerns to their own independent moral standard involves a fundamental misunderstanding of their role in morality. Therefore, I will be making two distinct claims: first, that a historical analysis of morality's development shows us that individualistic concerns were once internal components of socially-oriented moral values. Second, that efforts to separate these individualistic concerns from their social values – or to raise these individualistic concerns to serve as justifications for those social values – necessarily misconstrue those same individualistic concerns.

Title: Scotist Hylomorphism in Support of the Total Brain Death Criterion

Author: Tyler Wittenmyer

Abstract: Empirical evidence has led to the questioning of the brain death criterion for death. This is because a brain dead patient's body remains integrated, it can still grow and age. Catholic philosophers have based arguments for and against the brain death criterion on Thomist principles of hylomorphism. Given such principles the arguments against the brain death criterion appear stronger. John Duns Scotus provides an alternate set of principles. Scotus'

hylomorphism, unlike Thomas', can both defend the brain death criterion and adequately describe the facts of the body of the totally brain dead patient.