



Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall 2021 Meeting at Indiana University
Bloomington, IN, 12-13 November 2021

Meeting Program

Friday, 12 Nov	Session A Indiana Memorial Union Sassafras Room	Session B Indiana Memorial Union Persimmon Room
8:30-9:00	Registration (Indiana Memorial Union)	
	Medieval Philosophy Chair: Levi Tenen (Kettering)	Ethics Chair: Shannon Abelson (IUB)
9:00-9:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Turning Metaphysics into Logic” Rega Wood (IUB) & Calvin Normore (UCLA) tba	“Rights Reclamation” William Bell (WUSTL) Timothy Bloser (Augustana)
10:00-10:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Walter Chatton’s Argument for the Necessitation Principle” Emily McCarty (St Louis) Sam Pell (Purdue)	“Self-Effacement and Virtue Ethics,” Timothy Bloser (Augustana) Matthew Adams (IUB)
	Special Session in honor of David McCarty: Carnap and Quine Chair: Claire Richters (IUB)	Environmental Philosophy Chair: Graham Renz (WUSTL)
11:00-11:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“What is explication?” Gary Ebbs (IUB) Matt Carlson (Wabash)	“Utilitarianism, Animal Liberation, and Primitivism” James Schulz (IUPUI) Kevin Miles (Earlham)
12:00-12:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“McCarty contra Carnap and Quine” Andrew Smith (IUB) Jason DeWitt (Ohio State)	“A New Threat to Wilderness” Levi Tenen (Kettering) James Schulz (IUPUI)
12:55-2:00	Lunch	

	Special Session in honor of David McCarty: Philosophy of Math Chair: Jason DeWitt (Ohio State)	Feminist Philosophy Chair: Rega Wood (IUB)
2:00-2:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“The Problem of Isomorphic Structures” Owain Griffin (Ohio State) * winner of logic prize in honor of David McCarty David Fisher (IUB)	“Mere Physicalism and Biological Determinism” Tyler R. M. Sharp (Biola) * winner of the graduate essay prize Andréa Daventry (Western Carolina)
3:00-3:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Coming Around to Poincaré’s Circularity Objections” Matt Carlson (Wabash) Gabriel Day (Notre Dame)	“Seeing Oneself as a Source of Reasons” Andréa Daventry (Western Carolina) Nicole Dular (Franklin)
4:00-6:00	Keynote Address, Indiana Memorial Union, Dogwood Room “Intuitionistic Sets and Numbers: Small Set Theory and Heyting Arithmetic” Stewart Shapiro The Ohio State University	
6:00	Dinner (to be arranged informally after the sessions)	

Saturday, 13 Nov	Session A Woodburn Hall 003	Session B Woodburn Hall 004
8:30-9	Registration (Woodburn Hall)	
	Philosophy of Science Chair: Gary Ebbs (IUB)	Kant Chair: Gabriele Dillmann (Purdue)
9:00-9:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“The Fate of Tensor-Vector-Scalar Alternative Gravity” Shannon Abelson (IUB) Suzanne Kawamleh (IUB)	“Kant and the Miracle of Freedom” Michael Olson (Marquette) Kimberly Brewer (IUB)
10:00-10:55 Speaker: Commenter:	“Static Paradigms” Stan Howdysshell (South Florida) Andrew Ramirez (WUSTL)	“The Heteronomous Birth of Autonomy” Christopher Davidson (Mount St. Joseph) Morgana Lambeth (Purdue)

11:00-11:55	“Heidegger’s Critique of the Western Tradition and Modern Science” Speaker: Samuel Barnett (Marian) *undergraduate paper prize winner Commenter: Michael Botta (Marian)	“Affects, Choice and Kant’s Incorporation Thesis” Martina Favaretto (IUB) Ethan Kerns (IUB)
11:55-12:45	Lunch and Executive Meeting	
12:45	Student Awards Presentation	
	Religion, Epistemology, and Disagreement Chair: Michael Olson (Marquette)	Applied Ethics, Political, and Ancient Chair: John Park (Cal State, Sacramento)
1-1:55	“From Absolute Divine Power to Explosion” Speaker: Jacob Huls (St Louis) Commenter: Chad Carmichael (IUPUI)	“A Case Against a Case for the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis” Graham Renz (WUSTL) Sam Bennett (Purdue)
2-2:55	“Philosophical Disagreement and Intellectual Vice” Speaker: Galen Barry (Iona) Commenter: Jacob Huls (St Louis)	“Pluralism on Positive & Negative Liberty” John Park (California State, Sacramento) Jeremy Anderson (Depauw)
3-3:55	“Epistemic Accountability and Externalist Norms of Belief” Speaker: Daniel Buckley (Butler) Commenter: Galen Barry (Iona)	“Educational Tyranny” Richard Gunderman (IUPUI) Jack Hope (Butler)

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President Domenic D'Ettore, Marian University
Vice President Jeffrey Gower, Wabash College
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Abstracts

Shannon Abelson

“The Fate of Tensor-Vector-Scalar Alternative Gravity”

The GW170817 event co-detected by the LIGO and Virgo observatories clocked simultaneous arrival times for both gravitational waves and electromagnetic radiation emanating from a binary star merger. This detection event has been treated consistently within recent literature [8; 13; 4; 24] as a crucial test of all alternative theories of gravity (hereafter, AG) that postulate gravitational waves propagating along different geodesics from electromagnetic spectra—a test such theories fail. Those theories are purportedly thereby falsified. This includes relativistic extensions of Milgrom’s Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND), perhaps most notably Bekenstein’s Tensor-Vector-Scalar gravity (TeVeS). I discuss the explicit endorsement of falsificationism accompanying this position and evaluate whether such a position is consistent with other prominent epistemic commitments in fields of astronomy and astrophysics. I argue that while the current state of these theories is dim, it is not clear that recent developments in multimessenger observation can supply a decisive falsification.

Galen Barry

“Philosophical Disagreement and Intellectual Vice”

What, if anything, is the relationship between the widespread disagreement that is found in professional philosophy, and the intellectual virtues and vices of its practitioners? I offer two arguments for why we should think that the existence of widespread disagreement in philosophy is a sign that philosophers are much less intellectually virtuous than we think. The first argument proceeds from the truth-conducive nature of intellectual virtue. I argue that the truth-conducive nature of virtue is in tension with the fact that most philosophers are party to dozens of disagreements and most parties in those disagreements have false beliefs. The second argument proceeds from the role that concern for novelty plays in publication. I argue that it is likely that the novelty incentive is driving much of the disagreement in philosophy and that concern for novelty is indicative of intellectual vice. I close by considering one model of philosophy in which the individual vices of its practitioners might not matter.

William Bell

“Rights Reclamation”

According to a rights forfeiture theory of punishment, justification of liability to punishment hinges upon the notion that criminals forfeit their right against hard treatment. In this paper, I assume the success of rights forfeiture theory in establishing the permissibility of punishment but aim to develop this view by considering in what ways forfeited rights might be reclaimed. Built into the very notion of proportionate punishment is the idea that rights forfeited can be regained. The interesting question is whether punishment is the sole means for reclaiming forfeited rights. I argue for a pluralistic theory of rights reclamation: there are indeed multiple avenues by which the rights-

forfeiter can recapture their forfeited rights. In particular, I argue that compensation is a legitimate means by which a wrongdoer might partially, or fully, reclaim their right against punishment.

Timothy Blosier

“Self-Effacement and Virtue Ethics”

Self-effacement is now seen as a significant problem at least by many moral philosophers, a problem that any plausible moral theory should avoid. Lately, there has been a debate about whether virtue ethics, and in particular Aristotelian versions of virtue ethics, can avoid this problem. If it cannot, then, the worry goes, virtue ethics loses a possible, and significant, advantage that it might have seemed to have over other moral theories, most notably utilitarianism. Julia Annas has tried to defend Aristotelian virtue ethics against the charge of self-effacement (and, at the same time, egoism) by conceding that virtue ethics is self-effacing, but only in a benign way. Recently, Glen Pettigrove has argued that Annas’ attempts fail, and that self-effacement remains an insurmountable problem for Aristotelian virtue ethics. I will argue here that his response to Annas fails.

Daniel Buckley

“Epistemic Accountability and Externalist Norms of Belief”

Epistemic norms govern the formation, retention, and revision of our doxastic attitudes. A central task for epistemologists is to identify and articulate the content of such norms. How is this task to be carried out? On the approach that I defend here, the content of epistemic norms is connected with considerations related to agential responsibility. Specifically, I argue that we have a practice of epistemic accountability; a practice wherein we modify our trust and reliance in other people on the basis of their doxastic attitude. I argue that there's a strong prima facie case to be made for the legitimacy of this practice. Moreover, I argue that externalist norms of belief are needed in order to make sense of this practice.

Matt Carlson

“Coming Around to Poincaré’s Circularity Objections”

In several essays, mostly in a series of essays entitled “Mathematics and Logic” from 1905-1906, Henri Poincaré charged the foundational projects of the formalists (primarily Hilbert) and logicians (primarily Russell) with vicious circularity. Recent literature on these objections has taken the form of a debate over the success of those objections as directed against logicism in particular. By contrast, Poincaré’s objections to formalism and Hilbert’s program are generally taken to be unsuccessful, or at best, successful only against a version of formalism that fails to distinguish clearly between finitary and infinitary mathematics. But I think that we should re-evaluate the strength of P’s circularity objections. More specifically, I argue that Poincaré’s objections to Hilbert’s program are more subtle and powerful than they are given credit for. Moreover, once we correctly understand Poincaré’s objections to formalism, his criticisms of logicism appear to be more formidable, too.

Andréa Daventry

“Seeing Oneself as a Source of Reasons”

In this paper, I provide a novel account of gaslighting according to which gaslighting involves mistakenly failing to see oneself as a source of reasons with respect to some domain. I argue that this account does a nice job of explaining what’s gone wrong in various popular examples of gaslighting, and that it captures what different instances of gaslighting have in common even when they are quite different in other respects. I also show how this account of gaslighting explains a common intuition according to which gaslighting is autonomy-undermining—something other accounts, I argue, have failed to do. And finally, I show that this explanation of why gaslighting is autonomy-undermining also shows that certain forms of oppressive socialization are autonomy-undermining as well, thus providing us with an argument in favor of more substantive theories of autonomy according to which a certain kind of selfrespect is necessary for autonomy.

Christopher M. Davidson

“The Heteronomous Birth of Autonomy”

This talk applies Foucault’s theses about ethical practices of the self to Kant’s little-read lectures on moral pedagogy, *On Education*. In *On Education*, Kant says that reason (and hence recognition of moral duty) is absent in children and must be produced by external “discipline;” that inclinations like shame must be used to motivate children; that habitual “character” is essential to morality; and that character, once formed, is nearly impossible to change. Interestingly, these ideas run counter to Kant’s much more widely-read moral theory in the *Groundwork*. Regardless of whether these texts contradict each other or not, since both texts deny the importance of self-directed practices in adults, Kant inevitably cedes tasks of mature personal self-formation to authorities who “govern” or form the child.

Gary Ebbs

“What is explication?”

To answer this question there is no better place to start than with an examination of what Carnap and Quine say about explication. I shall argue that they are committed to a single, unified conception of explication, according to which: An explication aims to replace an “inexact” linguistic expression by a more “exact” one; A term is “exact” relative to a given task of explication to the extent that its formulation makes clear its role in a well-connected system of scientific notions that one takes as basic for that task; and the method of explication requires that the notions one aims to explicate not be among the primitive notions of the system of scientific notions that one takes as basic for the purposes of the explication.

Martina Favaretto

“Affects, Choice and Kant’s Incorporation Thesis”

Some think it is Kant’s view that affects prevent reflection and choice by forestalling them altogether. According to this reading, affects are immediate causes of action and acting from an affect falls outside the scope of the Incorporation Thesis. In this paper, I argue that we need not think that affects preclude deliberation and choice altogether; rather, they preclude deliberation and choice grounded on reasons for acting. I claim that because acting from an affect is an instance of choosing to act, it falls within the scope of the Incorporation Thesis. I first show what I have in mind when I hold that one can choose to act from an affect without taking that affect to be a reason for acting. Second, I show that choosing to act from an affect, without that choice being grounded on a reason for acting, could still count as acting on a maxim.

Owain Griffin

“The Problem of Isomorphic Structures”

In McCarty (2015) an argument is made to undermine the ante-rem structuralist account of mathematics. At the conclusion of his paper McCarty poses the question of whether the same argument ‘might not prove just as powerful when directed against the set-theoretic structuralists’. Through this paper I answer the question firstly by developing McCarty’s original argument, and then showing that set-theoretic structuralism does not fall victim to the challenge. I therefore conclude that the answer to McCarty’s question is negative: set-theoretic structuralism is not effectively undermined.

Richard Gunderman

“Educational Tyranny”

To avoid soft tyranny is one of the most urgent challenges facing education today. What seems to reorient us in the direction of efficiency may in fact disorient us entirely. What seems to magnify us to our grandest possible proportions may in fact reduce us to insignificance. A society of free and responsible individuals is only possible when people are educated for freedom and responsibility, and this is precisely what educational tyranny seeks to subvert. To resist strong tyrannies, we need strength. To resist soft ones, we must remain alert and oriented, jealously guarding our moral and political prerogatives against the encroachment of a stupefying expertise. Experts may have something to teach us, but ultimate responsibility for educational decision making must rest not on the top floor of administration buildings but on the ground, with students, teachers, and parents.

Stanford Howdyshell

“Static Paradigms”

Psychology is in the midst of a replicability crisis, where many of its studies and findings cannot be replicated. It is caused by a variety of factors, from research practices that increase the risk of false positives and unrepeatability findings to social incentives away from replication and towards taking published results at face value. These factors also lead to another problem, where the publishing of

false-positives and incentives away from publishing negative findings mean that the current paradigms that underlie psychology are not being challenged. Without these challenges, the flaws in the paradigms are not coming to light, making the advancement of psychology difficult. In this paper, I will explain what replicability crisis is and the factors that have led to it, and then the relationship between a science and the paradigms that it presupposes. I will conclude by showing how they interact to hold up the advancement of psychology.

Jacob Huls

“From Absolute Divine Power to Explosion”

I argue that what I call “absolute divine power” entails that all propositions are true (which is called “explosion”). Absolute divine power is the power to do literally anything: make contradictions true, analytic statements false. If God has absolute divine power, then for any absurdity we could think of, God could make it actual. I begin by explaining the traditional reason one might think that absolute divine power would entail explosion (which I dub the “naïve argument”). Then I explain a dialethic response to the traditional argument involving paraconsistent logics, which are logics in which explosion does not result from the truth of a contradiction. Then I go on to explain my new argument that absolute divine power entails explosion, which I maintain gets around the dialethic response utilizing paraconsistent logics. I conclude the paper by addressing a variety of potential objections to my argument.

Emily L. McCarty

“Walter Chatton’s Argument for the Necessitation Principle”

The necessitation principle holds that the existence of a truthmaker rules out the falsity of the proposition for which it is a truthmaker and so explains why that proposition is true. Necessitation is a controversial principle of truthmaker theory, yet few truthmaker theorists have attempted an argument for necessitation. In this paper, I examine an argument that medieval philosopher Walter Chatton gives in favor of the necessitation principle. Chatton was a contemporary of William of Ockham, and part of Chatton’s argumentative strategy against Ockham’s nominalist ontology was the development of a necessitation principle. Little analysis has been done of Chatton’s arguments for necessitation in the *Lectura*, and it is my aim to add to the existing analysis of Chatton’s work by examining one of his arguments for necessitation in that text. Such an analysis may be instructive for modern truthmaker theorists as to how to argue for the necessitation principle.

Calvin Normore and Rega Wood

“Turning Metaphysics into Logic”

“Turning Metaphysics into Logic: Richard Rufus on Self-Reference” is an essay about an early Metaphysics commentary which focuses on Metaphysics 7.6.1032a5-10, in which Aristotle claims that substances are the same as their ‘what it is to be’ or essence. It introduces the medieval distinction between signification and appellation or supposition, as tools for analyzing sentences like ‘Socrates and what it is to be Socrates are the same’ and ‘the being of an entity is an entity’. It

offers a suggestion about why this led Rufus to ask a series of questions evaluating various proposals for dealing with paradoxes of self-reference, and it invites its audience to assess that suggestion.

Michael Olson

“Kant and the Miracle of Freedom”

This paper argues that from the vantage of Kant’s Critical theoretical philosophy, human freedom is miraculous in the sense that both free acts and miracles are events that appear within nature in a way that indicates they are grounded in something outside the natural world. To defend this interpretation, the paper situates Kant’s analysis of freedom in the Dialectic of Pure Reason within the context of Christian Wolff’s rational cosmology and the debate instigated by its theory of miracles and the controversies instigated by Wolff’s effort to harmonize the possibility of supernaturally-grounded events with the causal determination of the world.

John Park

“Pluralism on Positive and Negative Liberty”

Some political philosophers have taken a stand exclusively on either favoring positive or negative liberty. Advocates of negative liberty commonly argue that the freedom government should provide is largely one of non-interference in the lives of its citizens or even nondomination. Some critics have endorsed positive freedom that the liberty government should provide is one of enhancing control over one’s life such that one may fulfill one’s interests. I espouse a pluralism that contains elements of both positive and negative liberty. By providing my own thought experiments, I give brand new arguments that the freedom government should provide its citizens is actually a mix of positive and negative liberty. Moreover, I draw the novel claim in the political philosophy literature that the concept of freedom lacks necessary and sufficient conditions.

Graham Renz

“A Case Against a Case for the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis”

Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which substances are composites of matter and form. Matter conceived as a collection of ordinary things—the bricks and timbers in a house—doesn’t require much of an existential case. Form, on the other hand, requires such a case be made in its favor. Contemporary hylomorphists have rallied around an argument offered by Kathrin Koslicki which purports to show that substances have forms as proper parts in addition to their material parts. I suggest that hylomorphists should look elsewhere for support for the existence of forms. Koslicki’s argument succeeds in establishing the existence of accidental forms only, and so makes room for a hylomorphic theory of accidental unities—things like wise-Socrates—but not a hylomorphic theory of substances. This is due to the fact that Koslicki’s argument hinges on cases where hylomorphism simply isn’t applicable.

James Schultz

“Utilitarianism, Animal Liberation, and Primitivism”

In this essay I examine the relationship between utilitarianism, animal liberation, and primitivism. I believe this is an area worthy of exploration because while much has been written about utilitarianism and vegetarianism it seems that very little has been written about utilitarianism and primitivism. Yet there seems to be a case for primitivism even if everyone became vegetarians because of the massive amount of harm humans impose on other animals by taking or damaging their habits and killing or injuring them in the process. I argue that while most forms of utilitarianism do not favor primitivism, there might be some forms, like average and negative utilitarianism that do.

T. R. M. Sharp

“Mere Physicalism and Biological Determinism “

Feminists have long resisted the notion that ‘biology is destiny’: namely, biological determinism [BD]. Since dicta of that kind have been used for the political and social subjugation of women, feminists take BD to be a particularly problematic doctrine. In historic and contemporary feminist philosophy, a distinction between sex and gender has been proposed in order to refute BD. I aver that even if this distinction succeeds in separating gender from biology, it fails to separate it from other low-level physical facts. I aver that if physicalism is true, then even if gender is not biological, it is still determined by physical facts that could be marshaled for patriarchal oppression of women. Consequently, feminists ought to reassess their allegiance to the thesis of physicalism. Here, I articulate the sex/gender distinction and its use in Feminist philosophy, explain its salience to physicalism, and refute a potential objection thereto.

Andrew Smith

“McCarty contra Carnap and Quine”

David Charles McCarty is an intuitionist. He disagrees with those who accept validity of the law of the excluded middle. Or does he? Rudolf Carnap and W.V. Quine believe anyone who appears to disagree with those who accept classical logical laws such as excluded middle do not, perhaps using words with a different meaning than the classical logician’s words. McCarty argues this flies in the face of how we understand one another. I propose all three philosophers share common ground in their disagreement about disagreement. They take ordinary interpretive practice as basic—they take our reactions and thoughts about language in ordinary interactions as our primary source of evidence for claims about meaning and understanding. What explains their different conclusions is different epistemological views or applications of ordinary interpretive maxims. I close by suggesting Timothy Williamson’s views are similar to McCarty’s and indicate how this sheds light on contemporary debates.

Levi Tenen

“A New Threat to Wilderness — SpaceX’s Starlink“

The Wilderness Act (1964) came about partly as a response to a piece of technology: the automobile. At the time, the National Park Service had historically focused on paving roadways so tourists could drive through the parks. Congress, and advocates for wilderness, worried that this failed to protect a special degree of solitude that can be experienced in natural areas with no roadways at all. As a result, The Wilderness Act prohibits cars and roads from wilderness. Since 1964, though, new forms of technology have appeared that may also limit peoples’ opportunity for solitude. In particular, I argue that certain communications technologies—such as SpaceX’s Starlink— do this and that we therefore ought to reconsider what wilderness preservation looks like today. So, after considering why wilderness solitude is important and how The Wilderness Act protects it, I explain how Starlink threatens that solitude. I then suggest a solution that allows SpaceX to continue developing its program without undermining wilderness.

Rega Wood and Calvin Normore

“Turning Metaphysics into Logic”

“Turning Metaphysics into Logic: Richard Rufus on Self-Reference” is an essay about an early Metaphysics commentary which focuses on Metaphysics 7.6.1032a5-10, in which Aristotle claims that substances are the same as their ‘what it is is to be’ or essence. It introduces the medieval distinction between signification and appellation or supposition, as tools for analyzing sentences like ‘Socrates and what it is to be Socrates are the same’ and ‘the being of an entity is an entity’. It offers a suggestion about why this led Rufus to ask a series of questions evaluating various proposals for dealing with paradoxes of self-reference, and it invites its audience to assess that suggestion.