Indiana Philosophical Association

Fall Meeting 2026, Stewart Center Rooms 311 & 313, Purdue University, West Lafayette

Meeting Program

Friday, 13 November	**Session 1 Stewart Center 311**	**Session 2 Stewart Center 313**
9:00 – 9:30	*Registration*	
	Group A	**Group B**
9:30 – 10:20am Speaker:	Do AI Robots Have Intentional Actions? Changshuo Sun	Not Just No Jingyi Wang
10:30 – 11:20am Speaker:	The "Grounds" for Choosing Immortality Matthew A. Vitello	Knowledge, Logic, and Taking Epistemic Logic Seriously Jiusi Guo
11:30 – 12:20am Speaker:	I am a person with (epistemic) principle Haodong Lyu	Two-Stage Process Ontology James Emery
12:30 – 2:15pm	*Lunch + IPA Business Meeting 1:30-2:15*	
	Group C	**Group D**
2:30 – 3:20pm Speaker:	Affording Creativity Dan Durso	Three Skeptical Challenges for Kalam Cosmological Argument Dan Linford
3:30 – 4:20pm Speaker:	Procedural Accounts and Loss of Insight Daniel Delgado Pove	Religious Experiences and Motivated Remembering Nesim Aslantata
4:30 – 5:45pm	*Keynote Address,* (**Stewart ADD LOCATION**) "Fear and Freedom" Daniel Frank, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University	
6:00pm	*Dinner*	

Saturday, 14 November	**Session A Stewart Center 311**	**Session B Stewart Center 313**
9:00 – 9:30	*Registration*	
	Group E	**Group F**
9:30 – 10:20am Speaker:	Promoting Wellness through Community and World-Travelling Benjamin Ross Gray	Kant on the Possibility of Freedom in the Third Antinomy Kutlu Tuncel
10:30 – 11:20am Speaker:	Ibn al-'Arabī's Epistle of the Glimmer Epistle of the Glimmer Ahmad Karkoutli	Repressive Social Norms and the Autonomy Dilemma Alex Vrabely
11:30 – 12:30pm	*Lunch*	
	Group G	**Group H**
12:30 – 1:20pm Speaker:	The Sublime Realized in Art Aikaterini Georgantziki	Primary Motive, Secondary Motive, and Impartiality Hongwon Jin
1:30 – 2:15pm Speaker	The Moral Dimensions of Entitlement James J. Murphy	Complexity and the Limit of Freedom Valerii Latyshev

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Registration Info

Registration fees are $20.00 for faculty and $10.00 for graduate students; undergraduates are welcome to attend the conference at no charge. Registration fees can be paid onsite or online (PayPal) here. If paying online, when prompted to "add a note" on the confirmation page, please enter your name and professional affiliation. If you are paying for more than one conference participant, please include the names and professional affiliations of everyone you would like to register.

Abstracts

Author: Nesim Aslantata
Title: "Religious Experiences and Motivated Remembering"

Abstract: This paper argues that having a religious experience (t1) and remembering one (t2) are epistemically distinct states. Drawing on research on the cognitive science of executive function, I argue that religious experiences can place demands on the mental processes involved in forming immediate and detailed memories of the encounter itself. Recent studies show that religious encounters can deplete the frontal executive system responsible for real-time encoding. This depletion leaves the subject with an attributional gap rather than a structured record of what occurred. At t2, this gap is potentially filled by motivated reasoning instead of neutral retrieval. I argue that the main reason why motivated reasoning hijacks the initial experience is that memory is governed by a drive for coherence with one's religious and social identity that regularly overrides the drive for correspondence with what actually happened. This happens through a mechanism of vicarious memory in which testimony from religious authorities or communities is imaginatively inhabited so vividly that it becomes phenomenally indistinguishable from first-person recall. The result is a t2- narrative that is coherent, vivid, and meaningful, but not thereby veridical. I use this framework to raise three objections to Daniel Munro's recent "Memory/Reflection Account." He treats t2 reflection as a generally reliable guide to what was experienced at t1 and treats coherence-seeking as an epistemic virtue. I argue against him that cognitive depletion and the drive for coherence constitute exactly the countervailing evidence needed to defeat an assumption of reliability in
religious experiences. The upshot is not that religious experience is uniformly unreliable. Instead, I argue that the reliability appropriate to t1 cannot simply be inherited by t2. Because motivated remembering in cognitively depleted agents show that the subject is not straightforwardly remembering it, but probably authoring it consistently with her previous religious and cultural background.

Author: Dan Durso
Title: "Affording Creativity"

Abstract: Due to growing questions about whether artificially intelligent systems can generate genuinely creative outputs or perform creative actions, discourse on the nature of creativity has received renewed attention. Standard accounts of creativity typically maintain that an artifact or idea must satisfy at least two conditions in order to count as creative: it must be both novel and valuable. Other proposals supplement this standard account with additional conditions or challenge the necessity of the value condition. The location of creativity is often disputed as well, that is, whether it can be found within a product, a person, or a process. With this project, I introduce an ecological account of creativity and argue that creativity is best understood as a situated process in which the novel employment of affordances contributes to the realization of a goal-directed function. I demonstrate how this account applies across a wide range of domains, including the arts, sciences, and various kinds of survival conditions. I conclude by discussing how this account of creativity provides new criteria for evaluating whether artificial systems can fully realize it.

Author: James Emery
Title: **“**Two-Stage Process Ontology”

Abstract: This paper develops a conception of process metaphysics that provides a novel solution in the debate concerning the status of the subject or agent in process. Traditionally, there are process philosophers who defend a monocategoreal, or one type, conception of process, arguing that every process is owned by or has a subject (Leibniz and Whitehead). Alternatively, there are defenders of a monocategoreal conception according to which processes are always unowned or without a subject (Johanna Seibt and Gilbert Simondon). There are also defenders of a multi-categoreal notion of process as consisting of both subjectless and subject-oriented process (Rescher). In this paper, I argue for a monocategoreal conception of process that can accommodate the intuitions underlying all three competing alternatives by understanding every process as unfolding in two distinct phases. The first phase, which I call “transition,” is subjectless and concludes with the production of a determinate position for the process and an originary, properly processual subject. The second phase is subject-oriented and terminates in the production of a fully determinate individual or action of the sort familiar to common sense. This two-phase notion of process brings elements of several different philosophers together (Seibt, Deleuze, Simondon, and Nobo’s interpretation of Whitehead) to conceptually reconcile the two competing intuitions we have about the status of process - as sometimes being without a clear subject or agent and other times with a clear subject - without having to abandon the definite advantages of a monocategoreal framework.

Author: Aikaterini Georgantziki
Title: “The Sublime Realized in Art”

Abstract: This paper investigates how Schelling transforms the Kantian sublime and why a feeling, emerging from the subject’s encounter with nature, can be represented in art. More specifically, regarding the dynamically sublime, I examine the Kantian notion of formlessness in nature insofar as it exceeds the subject’s capacity to withstand it, producing negative pleasure by virtue of the superiority of reason. Therefore, Kant privileges the sublime in nature over art, since incorporating the latter into his aesthetic theory would require combining the absence of form and purposiveness with the conditions of artistic production as well as placing the sublime alongside beauty, contrary to his original definition. This raises the question of how an artwork, itself purposively produced, could objectively manifest what is grounded in the subject. In this context, Schelling’s account lies in his broader theory of artistic production. In the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), although he views nature as productive, he claims that it cannot proceed from consciousness and hence act freely. Because genius unites conscious and unconscious activity, the work of art can objectify an identity that neither conscious freedom nor unconscious necessity can reveal independently. In the Philosophy of Art (1802 – 04) Schelling develops this line of inquiry further in his discussion of art’s symbolic character. Its highest forms disclose the identity of the ideal and the real, with poetry occupying a preeminent position as art’s ideal series. Language in particular, poetry’s medium, expresses the ideal while remaining a product of nature. This structure culminates in Greek tragedy through the noble disposition of the individual who freely accepts his misfortune rather than resisting it in favor of self-preservation, thereby embodying the indifference of freedom and necessity. Schelling thus

does not merely transfer the sublime from nature to art but reconfigures its relation to beauty and artistic portrayal.

Author: Benjamin Ross Gray
Title: "Promoting Wellness through Community and World-Travelling"

Abstract: Academia, education, and the professions – like medicine and law – are increasingly marked by isolation and mediated relationships, as factors like virtual education, consultations, meetings and conferences, artificial intelligence, and egocentric careerism shape the nature of our vocations. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction and disengagement have accordingly developed in concert and proven highly problematic for professionals and the institutions of which we are a part. This proposed paper would explore professional wellness through the lens of philosopher Maria Lugones and her concept of world-travelling in her seminal essay "Playfulness, World-Travelling, and Loving Perception." I argue that Lugones offers us an opportunity to appreciate how these underlying factors contribute to dissatisfaction and opportunities for mitigation. Key prerequisite claims that I argue for are that wellness is dependent on community and relationships, that our community relationships are strengthened by how well we know each other, and the degree to which we know one another depends on how we perceive. For Lugones, by imaginatively and playfully traveling to another's 'world, we are afforded the opportunity to "understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes" (Lugones, 1987). It is thus only through knowing each other's world that we really know each other. As such, by world-travelling, we may know each other more fully, strengthen our relationships, and promote wellness. If we take Lugones seriously, we must not only encourage world-travelling but also resist practices within academia and education that would inhibit it.

Author: Jiusi Guo
Title: "Knowledge, Logic, and Taking Epistemic Logic Seriously"

Abstract: Against the view that knowledge is the endpoint of successful inquiry, I argue that knowledge plays an active role within inquiry: It guides the formation of policies for inquiry. I defend this claim by developing a revisionary theory of knowledge, according to which knowledge is the representation of information suitable for policy formation. The theory takes epistemic logic not merely as a formal model of ordinary epistemic discourse but as a source of theoretical commitments about knowledge representation. The revisionary theory is an axiomatic theory, consisting of two axioms: the cell-relative factivity axiom and the meta-normative axiom. The cell-relative factivity axiom concerns the representational structure of knowledge: Knowledge only entails truth relative to the possibilities consistent with an agent's background assumptions, not necessarily truth at the actual world. This axiom follows from taking the epistemic-logical machinery at face value. The meta-normative axiom concerns the functional role of knowledge: Knowledge provides the informational basis for forming inquiry-guiding policies. This axiom is motivated by a functional presentation of the epistemic-logical machinery. Together, these two axioms characterize the theoretical role of knowledge in inquiry. Turning to the machine learning literature, I then illustrate how knowledge graphs provide a possible computational implementation of the revisionary-theoretic notion of knowledge. In an incomplete knowledge graph, represented relations constrain the space of possible completions, whereas open regions indicate where further inquiry may proceed. The resulting picture makes

knowledge not merely something inquiry aims at, but a resource from which the guidance to inquiring is provided to an inquirer.

Author: Hongwon Jin
Title: "Primary Motive, Secondary Motive and Impartiality"

Abstract: According to a traditional understanding of Kant's ethical theory, moral worth requires acting from the motive of duty as a primary consideration. Bernard Williams famously criticized this view, arguing that it introduces "one thought too many" into personal relationships, where
partial reasons should suffice. In response, some contemporary Kantians have proposed reconceptualizing duty as a secondary motive—a background constraint rather than a primary impetus to action. This paper defends the secondary motive approach against Jessica Isserow's recent critique that such views either fail to improve upon primary motive accounts or render duty irrelevant to moral worth. I argue that both interpretations of the secondary motive—as a filter screening potential actions and as a bodyguard ready to intervene when primary motives falter—withstand Isserow's objections when properly understood, particularly once the bodyguard is reconceived as a form of dispositional readiness that integrates habituated moral sensitivity with a latent capacity for explicit reflection. The secondary motive approach thus offers a convincing framework that accommodates the irreducible nature of partial reasons while preserving the essential role of impartial moral principles in regulating our choices. Beyond its implications for Kantian ethics specifically, I expect the point in this paper may bear on the more general question of how background considerations can shape and constrain motivation without themselves serving as an agent's operative reasons for acting—a structure relevant to any theory that posits a distinction between primary and secondary springs of action.

Author: Ahmad Karkoutli
Title: "Ibn al-'Arabī's Epistle of the Glimmer"

Abstract: This project is an analysis of the Risālah al-Lum'ah, the Epistle of the Glimmer, a treatise attributed to the Muslim mystic Muḥyiddīn Ibn al-'Arabī (1165 - 1249). This short work presents an understanding of causality - the effect is the exteriorization and apparent aspect of the cause – that sustains his theophanic cosmology. All creaturely existents (mawjūdāt) are loci for the manifestation of the Absolute according to the conditions of the temporal-morphological order of the cosmos. What is most intriguing about this theophanic perspective is the question of the ontological status of creaturely existents: If a creature is a determinate locus for the manifestation of the Absolute, how best to describe its existence in terms of identity and difference relative to the divine Absolute, the Reality? In the Epistle of the Glimmer, taking up some two and a half pages, Ibn al-'Arabī provides an answer in the form of a spiritual itinerary, tracing the ascent of the aspirant towards God through four stations of noetic abstraction, or tajrīd. Through this ascent, Ibn al-'Arabī articulates the relation between the self and God – the determinate and the Absolute – in a dialectical analysis of the cause-effect relationship. Depending on which 'pole' of this relation is considered, the conventional polarities of cause/effect existence/non-existence are overcome in the dynamic unity of tajallī, or theophany. As Ibn al-'Arabī moves through this dialectic, he reasons that the unity between the

Absolute and determinate can be affirmed alongside difference. Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology does not negate difference between the Absolute and determinate. However, rather strangely, the principal ontological differentiation emerges out of negation, out of nullity ('adam). I will present an exposition of the structure of this treatise as a catalyst for reflection on the interpretation of the existence/non-existence relationship and its significance for causality and metaphysics.

Author: Valerii Latyeshev
Title: "Complexity and the Limit of Freedom"

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that human free will is constitutively constrained by the complexity of our minds. I begin by defending the diachronic reflexive control requirement for free will. Namely: Our actions flow from our traits and values. So, if we want our actions to be up to us, our traits and values must be up to us. Which is to say, we need to have diachronic control over our traits and values. I then argue that human minds are complex systems. I take self-reflexivity and autocatalysis to be two marks of complexity and argue that they apply to human minds. Moreover, I argue that we are able to change our traits and values because of these two marks. But our control over any complex system is limited—our attempts often miss the mark, fail, or even backfire. So, because our minds are complex systems, our attempts at arriving at traits and values that we want will often fail. Therefore, the same conditions that put us in a position to exercise control over our traits and values ensure that this control remains limited. If this diachronic control is limited, then so is our free will.
1. We are in a position to try and exercise control over our traits and values because we are complex creatures.
2. Attempts to exercise control over any self-reflexive and autocatalytic complex system often fail.
3. So, because we are complex creatures, we often cannot successfully exercise control over our traits and values.
4. So, our complexity both puts us in the position of being able to try and exercise control over our traits and values and limits this control in turn.

Author: Dan Linford
Title: "Three Skeptical Challenges for the Kalam Cosmological Argument"

Abstract: The Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) infers the existence of God from the premise that the universe began to exist. Here, I show that this premise faces three interrelated skeptical challenges. The first challenge concerns the conceptual connection between temporal finitude and having a beginning: even if the past is finite, that alone does not entail that the universe began to exist. Existing proposals for specifying what it means for something to begin either fail to distinguish beginninged from beginningless entities or they fail to provide a non-arbitrary reason for applying the criterion to the universe but not to God. The second challenge arises from the epistemology of scientific realism. While General Relativistic cosmological models may suggest a finite past, the universe's earliest moments are beyond the domain of current physics and are, for that reason, epistemically unwarranted. Thus, our best scientific theories cannot support a positive case for the beginning of the universe. According to the third challenge, our best scientific theories cannot support a negative case for the beginning of the

universe, either. Even if each known past-eternal cosmological model is improbable, the disjunction of all past-eternal models (including those yet unimagined) may still have a high epistemic probability. Given the three skeptical challenges, the question of whether the universe began remains epistemically inaccessible. Though this may change in future scientific or philosophical inquiry, our current epistemic vantage point does not warrant us to say that we know the KCA is sound.

Author: Haodong Lyu
Title: "I am a Person with (Epistemic) Principle"

Abstract: Doxastic compatibilists maintain that our inability to believe at will is compatible with our doxastic control over beliefs and responsibility for them, hence the name compatibilist. One influential compatibilist approach, namely, the reasons-responsive account, states that our belief-formation being reasons-responsiveness is necessary and sufficient for grounding doxastic control and epistemic responsibility. Reasons-responsiveness is generally understood in terms of the following two capacities. Reasons-receptiveness, the capacity to recognize epistemic reasons in an intelligible pattern; and reasons-reactiveness, the capacity to form or revise doxastic attitudes in response to recognized reasons. This paper challenges the claim that reasons-responsiveness is necessary for doxastic control and epistemic responsibility. Below is the argument. Consider a Luther-style agent, L, who steadfastly endorses Deductive Purism: only deductively established propositions merit belief. L consistently implements this principle, suspending judgment on ordinary empirical propositions regardless of the perceptual or inductive evidence available. L's commitment obstructs both components of reasons-responsiveness. First, she fails to be receptive to empirical reasons: she refuses to recognize perceptual and inductive evidence as reasons for belief. Second, she fails to be reactive to those reasons: even if she acknowledged their evidential force, her unwavering commitment to Deductive Purism would prevent her from abandoning suspension without deductive proof. L's epistemic principle thus blocks both recognizing empirical reasons and adjusting her attitudes in response to them. In short, L is not reasons-responsive. Nevertheless, L exercises considerable control over her doxastic life. She systematically governs what she believes and withholds according to an epistemic principle she firmly upholds without being responsiveness to evidence. Moreover, L's failure to be reasons-responsive does not exempt her from epistemic responsibility. We are inclined to regard a radical skeptic like L as irrational and deserving of epistemic criticism. Conclusion: The Luther-style agent L manifests a kind of control that the reasons-responsive account cannot capture and also supports the claim that an agent needs not be reasons-responsive to be held epistemic responsible.

Author: James J. Murphy
Title: "The Moral Dimensions of Entitlement"

Abstract: Philosophers writing about entitlement have generally pointed to paradigmatic cases, such as that exhibited by incel mass killers, without offering an account of what entitlement is. That task has been left up to psychologists, who characterize entitlement as an exaggerated sense that one is special and deserving. But the varied findings by psychologists suggest a far more complex picture than is captured by this brief characterization. My central aim is to develop an account of entitlement as a vice corresponding to the virtue of due self-respect. The vice of

entitlement involves failures along all of the moral dimensions of due self-respect: action, evaluation, motivation, affect, perception, and reflection. My account of entitlement as a vice, I show, accomplishes four tasks: (1) it unifies and explains the many varied and perhaps surprising findings by psychologists about entitled people, (2) it resolves a puzzle about highly entitled people that has confused psychologists, (3) it explains longstanding observations by feminist theorists about men's sexist attitudes and expectations, and (4) it opens up a new puzzle about the relation between entitlement and the psychology of high performers, such as professional athletes.

Author: Daniel Delgado Pove
Title: "Procedural Accounts and Loss of Insights"

Abstract: Procedural accounts of autonomy are among the most influential in the literature. They usually hold that an action is autonomous if and only if it results from an adequate process in which the agent understands the relevance of reasons, embedded in a hierarchical structure of endorsement whereby the agent identifies with their most meaningful values. Because such accounts treat how an agent comes to endorse values (rather than what they value) as essential to autonomy, they are content-neutral: they place no constraint on the values an agent could hold and still count as Autonomous. I argue that certain mental disorders that present "loss of insight" (a state where the agent doesn't recognize their disorder as such), such as persistent depressive disorder, moral scrupulosity, and anorexia nervosa, pose an insurmountable challenge to such accounts, since they unify rather than disjoint the agents' preferences and values. I show how two influential procedural accounts cannot accommodate the intuition that these disorders are (to some extent) autonomy-Undermining. First, in Frankfurt's hierarchical model, loss of insight allows the disorder to cease fragmenting the self and instead to constitute it by unifying the agent's first- and second-order desires, which the patient endorses. Second, Christman's historical account focuses not on identification but on how the person relates to their acquisition. But these conditions are transformative experiences, so the ego-syntonic agent would take it that they would not have resisted it. Saving the intuition that the patient would resist the desire-forming process absent the disorder requires evaluating it before the disorder "takes hold", but since such disorders are constitutively rather than causally related to their symptoms, this is tantamount to requiring the agents to have some specific values. These accounts thus face a dilemma: treat the most severely affected patients as paragons of autonomy or abandon content neutrality.

Author: Changshuo Sun
Title: "Do AI Robots Have Intentional Actions?"

Abstract: This paper examines whether AI robots have intentional actions by analyzing Figure 01, a humanoid robot integrating advanced AI systems. I evaluate Figure 01's movements against Anscombe's two criteria for intentional action, namely the"Why" question criterion and the non-observational knowledge criterion, as well as two philosophical accounts of intentional action: the causal account and the instrumental structure account. I argue that Figure 01's movements fail the non-observational knowledge criterion and the causal account, since AI robots know what they are doing through observation, and current AI systems lack the consciousness required for the mental states the causal account demands. Although Figure 01's movements initially seem to satisfy the "Why" question criterion and the instrumental structure

account, I argue that both of these promising claims ultimately fail because Figure 01's movements lack "its own purposes" ; and "its own reasons": the robot cannot decide not to execute purposes derived from human requests, nor can it decide not to appeal to those purposes as reasons. Nonetheless, I argue that AI robot movements remain philosophically interesting as phenomena that lie between mere tool movements and human intentional actions. Drawing from Noller's framework of extended human agency, I propose that AI robot movements are best understood as extended human intentional actions, extending human intentional actions in three ways: (1) directly augmenting human capacity, (2) inheriting and spreading human purposes embedded in training data, and (3) integrating into interwoven human practices.

Author: Kutlu Tuncel
Title: "Kant on the Possibility of Freedom in the Third Antinomy"

Abstract: The Third Antinomy suggests that it is at least possible that human beings have noumenal characteristics in which they are free, though determinism holds in appearances. In this paper, I examine the following question: in what sense does the Third Antinomy make freedom possible? First, I consider Kant's theory of possibility, according to which, on the face of it, there seem to be two types of possibility: the logical, which concerns non-contradiction, and the real, which concerns instantiability in appearances. Second, I address the common response in the literature to the question above. In this response, Kant argues for the logical rather than the real possibility of freedom in the Antinomy because he makes it clear that freedom cannot be cognized and instantiated in appearances. I call this response the 'Logical Possibility Reading' (LPR for short). Third, I argue that the LPR is unsatisfactory because it leaves the argument of the Third Antinomy undermotivated. Logical possibility is easily obtainable, in the sense that we can 'invent' concepts like 'soothsaying' that enjoy logical possibility. Establishing freedom as a logically possible concept in this kind would be too cheap. Fourth, instead of the LPR, I offer my account, according to which the sense of possibility of freedom in the Third Antinomy is a third type of possibility: I call it 'non-schematized real possibility.' I maintain that this third type of possibility is distinct from the other two. It is distinct from what we earlier call real possibility because the latter is schematized. It is also distinct from logical possibility since it concerns not consistency of representations in thought but determinations of an object in general.

Author: Matthew A. Vitello
Title: "The 'Grounds' for Choosing Immortality"

Abstract: In Bernard Williams' "Makropulos Case" (1973), Williams seems to rely on the idea that categorical desires will necessarily become depleted over the course of an immortal life as they are fulfilled but not sufficiently replaced. Many critics find that he exaggerates the difficulty of indefinitely replacing such desires, and so the argument seems to unravel. These critics, however, tend to miss the role that categorical desires play in Williams' wider views on personal identity, desires, and particularly ground projects. In this paper, I argue that Williams' case against the merits of immortality makes more sense under my proposed Makropulos*, where it is ground projects, not simple categorical desires, that sustain a viable life and are gradually lost over an immortal one. I argue that we have good reason to believe that Williams takes ground

projects to be at least partially constituted by categorical desires, and ground projects require social recognition to sustain themselves. Indeed, those desires that underpin ground projects may exclude some more basic possible categorical desires. What ultimately renders immortality unchoiceworthy, then, is not the depletion of categorical desires per se, but rather the impossibility of socially sustaining over eternity the ground projects they partially constitute. I demonstrate how Makropolis* provides Williams responses to some major objections to Makropolis. Finally, I defend Makropulos* itself from an objection due to Christopher Belshaw (2015).

Author: Alex Vrabely
Title: "Repressive Social Norms and the Autonomy Dilemma"

Abstract: A central question for theories of autonomy is determining whether autonomy depends solely on how an agent arrives at their preferences or also on the content of the preferences endorsed; theories of the former type are categorized as procedural, the latter as substantive. Natalie Stoljar has argued that feminist philosophers should favor a substantive theory of autonomy. In doing so, she analyzes the situation of women who live under oppressive or patriarchal social norms. If a woman were to follow the correct reflective procedure, then procedural autonomy theorists would be committed to saying that women who take actions that further the system of norms (regardless of endorsement or lack thereof) autonomously reinforce the very system that oppresses them. If moral responsibility follows from autonomy, then they are further morally responsible for their own, and others', oppression. This conflicts with what Stoljar calls the feminist intuition, the intuition that preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity cannot be autonomous. A substantive theory avoids this consequence by taking into account the content of the norms that impact an agent's decision making. If the content of the norm is oppressive, then, even following the correct reflective procedure, the agent is nonautonomous. One problem, as J.Y. Lee points out, is that adopting such a view risks letting oppressors themselves off the hook; it seems that a man raised in that same system would be similarly nonautonomous with respect to restrictive norms. In response, Lee argues for an asymmetry of autonomy between men and women. In this paper, I will argue that Lee's argument fails; the asymmetry she presents is not of the relevant kind. However, that does not mean that feminist philosophers should be pessimistic with respect to resolving the dilemma between choosing a procedural or a substantive theory of autonomy.

Author: Jingyi Wang
Title: "Not Just No"

Abstract: It is commonly thought to be irrational to have attitudes (or a lack thereof) that fail to cohere with one another. Philosophers refer to such incoherence-involving instances of irrationality as instances of structural irrationality. On a popular, requirement-based view, structural rationality corresponds to a distinctive set of requirements, the violation of which incurs structural irrationality. There is a further debate regarding how exactly to formulate these requirements, and a dominant view emerges from two choice points: the wide-scope view over the narrow-scope view, and the material conditional interpretation of the embedded conditional. On this currently dominant view, structural rational requirements prohibit incoherent combinations of attitudes, and that's it. Call this the plain prohibition view. On it, the enkratic

requirement, a paradigmatic requirement of structural rationality, is formulated as ("B" for belief, "I" for intention):

$R(B\text{: } One\ ought\ to\ \varphi \supset I\text{: } To\ \varphi)$.

or equivalently,

$R3{\sim}(B\text{: } One\ ought\ to\ \varphi\ \&{\sim}I\text{: } To\ \varphi)$.

The plain prohibition view faces two problems. I raise the first, the proliferation problem: under certain assumptions, the view validates a suspicious inference that leads to a proliferation of structural rational requirements. The second, recently identified by Fogal and Risberg (2025), is the differentiation problem: the plain prohibition view appears unable to explain the intuitive difference between combinations of attitudes that strike us as positively coherent and random combinations that seem neither positively coherent nor positively incoherent.

I argue that neither problem requires us to forgo a requirement-based view in the wide-scope spirit, yet we do need to move beyond the plain prohibition view. On my alternative account, the requirements of structural rationality prohibit incoherent combinations of attitudes, but there's more – they robustly prohibit. More specifically, I advance the following wide-scope interpretation of the enkratic requirement: Rationality requires, regardless of the rational status of her believing that she ought to φ and the rational status of her intending to φ, that: if an agent believes that she ought to φ, then she intends to φ. And the enkratic requirement should be formalized, very roughly, as consisting of two parts:

First, $R(B\text{: } One\ ought\ to\ \varphi \supset I\text{: } To\ \varphi)$.

Second, $R(B\text{: } One\ ought\ to\ \varphi \supset I\text{: } To\ \varphi)$ is robust.

I unpack robustness in terms of invariance with respect to any (admissible) combination of a putative rational status of the belief and a putative rational status of the intention. I call the resulting view the robust prohibition view. The view solves both problems with grace. It further sheds new and interesting light on the requirement-based view, by both vindicating and qualifying the felt necessity of the structural rational requirements.